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The members of the [private military security] firm were polite and
generally helpful, but the ambiguity between who they were and what
they were doing always hung in the air. They were employees of a
private company, but were performing tasks inherently military. It
just did not settle with the way [Americans] tended to understand
either business or warfare. However, there they were, simply doing
their jobs, but in the process, altering the entire security balance of
1
the region.

INTRODUCTION
September 16, 2007, began as a typical hot day in Baghdad, Iraq.2 Nisour
Square, the once-upscale section of Baghdad, bustled with Iraqis
commemorating the month of Ramadan, the holiest month of the Islamic
calendar.3 Shoppers bravely battled the oppressive heat to make preparations
for a festive meal, signifying the end of the fast.4 The usual midday traffic
crowded the streets.5 Around noon, armed members of a security-detail team
entered Nisour Square in four large armored vehicles with 7.62-millimeter
machine guns mounted atop.6 They were armed with an SR-25 sniper rifle,
M-4 assault rifles, M-240 machine guns, grenades, and grenade launchers,
among other weapons.7 The security convoy entered the congested intersection
at Nisour Square, compelling Iraqi traffic police to stop local traffic abruptly
and to allow the convoy to proceed.8 Without warning, in the middle of the
one-way street, the convoy made an abrupt U-turn and sped directly into
oncoming traffic.9 Suddenly, and seemingly without provocation, members of
the security team opened fire upon unarmed civilians.10 The team proceeded to

1

P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY vii (3d ed.
2008). This quote describes the privately contracted military firms’ involvement in the Balkans in the 1990s.
Over the last decade, we have made little progress in understanding and categorizing these entities.
2 JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 3
(2008).
3 Id. at 3–4.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 4, United
States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 08-360) (RMU).
8 SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 4.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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indiscriminately shower bullets upon women and children retreating to
defensive positions.11
The operator of one vehicle targeted by the Wild West-style gun battle was
a twenty-three-year-old medical student chauffeuring his mother.12 The
security team shot the unarmed civilians in the vehicle point-blank in the head
and continued firing at least forty bullets upon the vehicle, causing it to
explode.13 The two bodies were left completely charred and unrecognizable.
Dental records and the remains of one of the victim’s shoes later confirmed
their identities.14 Additionally, Little Bird helicopters arrived to aid the
convoys and began firing in like fashion on the cars.15 The attack lasted fifteen
minutes (despite the alarmed pleas of “cease fire!”), leaving seventeen Iraqis
dead in the same streets which moments before buzzed with commerce.16 A
military review concluded there was not a single insurgent among the fatally
wounded Iraqis,17 who now lay scattered, falling wherever they lost their battle
to reach a safe haven.
The security convoy conducting the mission was not an elite covert military
unit; in fact, this security detail had no direct association with any statesanctioned military force. The Nisour Square massacre was carried out solely
by Blackwater, a privately owned security aide to the United States, in
conjunction with a lucrative security and defense contract with the State
Department.18 While incidents of targeted violence against Iraqi civilians were
neither unique nor isolated, this was the first widely reported shooting spree
that was conducted on such a large scale against unarmed civilians, perpetrated
exclusively by a privately contracted military firm (“PCMF”).19 The aftermath
11

Id. at 4–8.
Id. at 4–6.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 8.
16 Id. at 3–6.
17 David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2007, at A1.
18 The fact that Blackwater was employed by the State Department and not the Department of Defense
was at issue in the government’s prosecution of the case. See infra Part I.
19 See, e.g., E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and
Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 229 (2008).
PCMFs have been at the heart of many different small scale controversies involving criminal misconduct and
human rights abuses. Id. In the 1990s, employees of DynCorp, a security company hired by the United States
in Bosnia, were accused of a sex-trafficking scandal. Id. PCMFs were involved in the Abu Ghraib prison
abuses. Id. Employees of Aegis, a British corporation, were videotaped arbitrarily shooting Iraqis. Id. In
February 2007, a Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) contractor was charged for beating an Afghan man to
12

YASIN GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

7/7/2011 9:29 AM

PLAYING CATCH-UP

415

following the incident catapulted PCMFs into the public spotlight, thereby
opening a Pandora’s box of legal questions.20 Who were these armed,
uniformed personnel rivaling a small army and performing quasi-military
functions? Who—or alternatively, what state or entity—was responsible for
such widespread and horrific crimes committed against unarmed civilians?
What legal protections, if any, should these pseudo-soldiers be accorded?
As of March 2010, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) estimated there
were 207,600 DOD contractors supporting troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.21
This estimate does not include contractors employed by other U.S. agencies.22
At least 60 different PCMFs are operating in Iraq,23 hiring nationals of at least
30 different countries;24 26% of the contractor workforce is comprised of U.S.
citizens,25 56% are third-country nationals,26 and the remaining 18% of
contractors are Iraqi citizens.27 The DOD “increasingly relies upon contractors
to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has resulted in a DOD
workforce that has 19% more contractor personnel (207,600) than uniformed

death during an interrogation. Id. This is by no means a comprehensive list of recorded abuses conducted by
PCMFs; the actual number of abuses is unknown because each PCMF has a different internal mechanism of
recording and punishing such behavior. See Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers, Private Contractors, and
the Problem of International Law Compliance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355, 380–82 (2010). Furthermore,
misconduct is frequently underreported to the government. Id.
20 “An investigative team made up of officials from Iraq’s Interior, National Security, and Defense
ministries said in a preliminary report that ‘the murder of citizens in cold blood in the Nisour area by
Blackwater is considered a terrorist action against civilians just like any other terrorist operation.’” SCAHILL,
supra note 2, at 14. Iraqi investigators were denied access to the Blackwater contractors, despite Iraq’s explicit
statement of intent to prosecute the criminal acts. Id.
21 MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40764, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 5 (2010).
22 Id. Analysts have called the reliability of the DOD data into question. The Government Accountability
Office revealed “that the DOD’s quarterly contractor reports were not routinely checked for accuracy or
completeness.” Id. at 4. Further, the DOD did not start collecting contractor data until the second half of 2007,
despite employing contractors from the onset of operations. Id. Additionally, keeping track of contractors is a
tremendous challenge, as “contractors rotate in and out of theater more often than soldiers do.” DAVID
ISENBERG, SHADOW FORCE: PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ 11 (2009).
23 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 62.
24 JENNIFER K. ELSEA, MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KENNON H. NAKAMURU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32419, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 3
(2008). Contractors come from countries such as Bosnia, Britain, Nepal, Chile, Ukraine, Israel, South Africa,
New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, India, Honduras, Peru, and Columbia. ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 37, 39–40.
25 SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 9.
26 Id. Many of the third-country nationals are not properly vetted; indeed “not everyone recruited had a
military or even security background. One person recruited in El Salvador used to be a mason’s assistant.”
ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 40. Furthermore, third-country nationals are often paid five to six times less than
their American counterparts. Id. at 41.
27 SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 9.
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personnel (175,000).”28 The United States is entangled in a pattern of
unprecedented reliance upon PCMFs to conduct conflict resolution and nationbuilding. In fact, many analysts argue the DOD cannot execute large missions
absent contractor support.29 The increased number of PCMFs directly
correlates with increased PCMF-related instances of misconduct.30 The use of
PCMFs poses many legal problems, resulting in the “blurring of lines between
policing and combat and the general blending of roles that accompany
operating in a combat zone.”31 Nonetheless, international and domestic law
have failed to recognize and affirmatively designate mechanisms to prosecute
such misconduct.32 Therefore, the paramount legal question is: What is the
legal status of these entities?
Unfortunately, to date, there is a dearth of international and domestic law
that concisely defines the legal status of a PCMF. The only existing legal
certainty is that PCMFs are not state-based military actors.33 Without
according legal status to PCMFs, no coherent framework exists to analyze a
host of legal issues, including, but not limited to, the following: which
sovereigns can exercise jurisdiction to prosecute claims by or against PCMFs
(criminal or civil);34 the liability of contracting states for transgressions
committed by PCMFs;35 what body of law should govern wrongful conduct
involving PCMFs;36 and lastly, whether any legal protections extend to
PMCFs.37 This Article engages the legal abyss within which PMCFs operate,
and in response proposes a comprehensive analytical framework for evaluating
the status of PCMFs. Specifically, the proposal delineates categories, attaches
status-based liability, and extends legal protection to PCMFs operating in
conflict and post-conflict zones.
Part I of this Article analyzes the shortcomings of both international and
domestic law regulating PCMF conduct through examining the Nisour Square
massacre aftermath. Part II analyzes current international and domestic law to
28

Id. at Summary.
Id. at 1.
30 DEBORAH AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING SECURITY 8 (2008).
31 Id. at 21.
32 Francesco Francioni, Private Military Contractors and International Law: An Introduction, 19 EURO.
J. INT’L L. 961, 963 (2008).
33 Id. at 962.
34 Id.
35 See Carsten Hoppe, Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Military Companies, 19 EURO. J. INT’L
L. 989, 990 (2008).
36 Francioni, supra note 32, at 962.
37 Id. at 962–63.
29
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determine whether PCMFs fit within an existing legal framework. In
particular, Part II engages a brief historical analysis of the law of mercenarism,
both drawing parallels and distinguishing between the legal definition of
mercenaries and PCMFs. This analysis concludes that current international law
cannot regulate PCMF conduct, rendering the term “mercenary” irrelevant in
the PCMF context. This Part also analyzes the potential domestic jurisdictional
statutes that arguably encompass PCMF misconduct. Again, the analysis
concludes that domestic law is incapable of providing a comprehensive
solution to the PCMF problem. Part III examines the convergence of three
novel legal developments: (1) the ambiguous form of twenty-first century
warfare, (2) the outsourcing of the state monopoly over the use of force, and
(3) the rising influence of transnational corporations. Part IV provides a
framework to categorize PCMFs, which exhibit both military and corporate
characteristics. Part V discusses contemporary legal scholarship and analyzes
recommendations to solve the PCMF accountability gap. This Part concludes
that none of the recommendations, taken individually, solves the PCMF legal
conundrum. Lastly, Part VI presents an alternative legal framework, concisely
defining the status of PCMFs and delineating domestic and international
mechanisms of liability and protection.
I. EXAMINING THE BLACKWATER PROSECUTION (OR LACK THEREOF)
On September 16, 2007, Blackwater employees opened fire on unarmed
Iraqis in Baghdad’s Nisour Square, killing seventeen Iraqis and wounding
twenty, many of whom were women and children.38 The vast majority of
eyewitnesses and forensic investigations stated that the massacre was
unprovoked.39 Victims and their families were denied legal recourse, and
Blackwater contractors remained unaccountable.40 A brief description of the
events and policies implemented in post-war Iraq is necessary to appreciate the
ambiguous status of PCMFs.
A. CPA and Beyond: Limiting Iraq’s Jurisdictional Reach
On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared the end of major
combat operations in Iraq.41 Despite the proclamation of victory, the
38

See supra notes 2–18 and accompanying text.
SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 33.
40 See infra Part I.B.
41 Jarrett Murphy, Text of Bush Speech: President Declares End to Major Combat Operations, CBS
NEWS WORLD (May 1, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/01/iraq/main551946.shtml.
39
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administration had vastly underestimated the cost and resources required for
the ensuing occupation.42 There was no coherent military or civilian strategy to
counteract the vacuum of power that toppling Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship
created and, further, no mechanism to provide security and reduce sectarianinsurgent violence was contemplated.43
Shortly after President Bush’s declaration of victory, the United States,
lacking a long-term post-war plan, created the Coalition Provisional Authority
(“CPA”), to aid and regulate the restructuring of the newly sovereign Iraq.44
The United States unilaterally formed the CPA as the interim governing body
of Iraq, appointing L. Paul Bremer III45 as the head of the organization.46 The
CPA garnered tremendous criticism from Iraqis, as well as State Department
officials, who questioned the legitimacy of the CPA’s legal authority to govern
Iraq.47 Nonetheless, once the CPA came to power, Bremer issued decrees on
property, persons, banking, and the press, to name a few, and ultimately
delayed the establishment of a sovereign, Iraqi-led government.48

42 See generally Frontline: Private Warriors (PBS television broadcast June 21, 2005), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/.
43 Id.
44 L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32370, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
(CPA): ORIGIN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 1 (2004).
45 Bremer was previously a Foreign Service Officer who spoke no Arabic, had no prior experience in the
Middle East or in post-war reconstruction, and never served in the military. NO END IN SIGHT (Magnolia
Pictures 2007). He was called by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld ten days before taking the position of head of
CPA. Id.
46 It is worth noting that the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (“ORHA”) was
created in January of 2003 under the Department of Defense. See, e.g., Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq,
AIR UNIV., http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/postwar_iraq.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). It was
composed of many different offices of the U.S. government, coalition partners, and private sector stakeholders.
Id. ORHA was formed for the express purpose of managing the distribution of humanitarian aid and “building
the new Iraq both physically and politically.” Id. ORHA prepared for a short transition period and the swift
implementation of an interim government with full Iraqi sovereignty and expressly informed the Department
of Defense as such. Id. However, much to the surprise of post-war Iraq strategists, ORHA was dismantled in
favor of the CPA. Id. Faisal Al-Istrabidi, the Iraqi Ambassador to the United Nations, stated, “[The Iraqis] had
expected, and I think I can say we had been promised, there would be a sovereign government virtually
immediately.” NO END IN SIGHT, supra note 45.
47 HALCHIN, supra note 44, at Summary. “The lack of an authoritative and unambiguous statement about
how this organization was established, by whom, and under what authority leaves open many questions,
particularly in the areas of oversight and accountability.” Id. Oddly, it is unclear what branch of government,
or alternatively, under what statute or order, the CPA was created. Id. Indeed, there is no “authoritative and
unambiguous statement about how this organization was established, by whom, and under what authority.” Id.
48 Frontline: Truth, War, and Consequences (PBS television broadcast Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/view/?utm_campaign=viewpage&utm_medium=grid&utm_so
urce=grid.
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One week prior to the disbandment of the CPA and restoration of Iraq’s
limited sovereignty, the CPA issued Order No. 17,49 which states, “Contractors
shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by
them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract
thereto.”50 This order had not been officially overturned prior to the Nisour
Square shootings.51 More troubling, perhaps, is that Article 130 of the Iraqi
Constitution states, “Existing laws shall remain in force, unless annulled or
amended in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”52 Two
months after the Nisour Square incident and in response to perceived PCMF
immunity, on November 1, 2007, Iraq’s Parliament drafted a bill to revoke
PCMF’s legal immunity previously granted by CPA Order No. 17; however,
the bill was never formally passed.53 On November 17, 2008, the United States
49 Coalition Provisional Auth. Order No. 17 of 2004 (Iraq), reprinted as revised at http://www.
iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf (2004)
[hereinafter CPA Order No. 17].
50 Id. Interestingly, Bremer, under whose supervision the order was drafted, stated, “The immunity is not
absolute. The order requires contractors to respect all Iraqi laws, so it’s not a blanket immunity.’’ Alissa J.
Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer, News Analysis; The Judgment Gap in a Case Like the Blackwater Shootings,
There Are Many Laws but More Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=9E04E3D8123DF932A25753C1A9619C8B63&fta=y&scp=1&sq=%22the%20judgment%20gap%2
2&st=cse. This further muddles whether the CPA Order No. 17 would apply to the Nisour Square shootings.
The only other recourse Iraq could claim to exercise jurisdiction would be to have the United States expressly
waive in writing the contractor’s immunity from Iraqi legal process. “Requests to waive immunity for
Contractors shall be referred to the relevant Sending State in relation to the act or acts for which waiver is
sought. Such a waiver, if granted, must be express and in writing to be effective.” CPA Order No. 17, supra
note 49, § 5(3).
51 The status of Order No. 17 became extraordinarily muddled:

Iraqi officials announced their intent to bring criminal charges against the Blackwater forces
involved in the shooting, and the Iraqi ministries’ report stated, “The criminals will be referred to
the Iraqi court system.” Abdul Sattar Ghafour Bairaqdar, a member of Iraq’s Supreme Judiciary
Council, the country’s highest court, declared, “This company is subject to Iraqi law, and the
crime committed was on Iraqi territory, and the Iraqi judiciary is responsible for tackling the
case.”
SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 14–15. The CPA’s authority, as an interim government, to hand out complete
immunity to contractors came under scrutiny. Robert Nichols, Iraq Reconstruction: Political Situations
Creating Legal Risks for Contractors, 5 INT’L GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 63 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.
crowell.com/documents/Iraq-Reconstruction_Political-Situations-Creating-Legal-Risks-for-Contractors.pdf.
How could an organization, which appeared to be illegitimate on its face, have the authority to cede Iraq’s
sovereignty in prosecuting claims occurring squarely in its own territory and affecting its nationals?
52 Article 130, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
53 Iraqi Minister Council Removes Legal Immunity from Foreign Private Security Firms, IRAQ NEWS
MONITOR (Nov. 11, 2007), http://iraqnewsmonitor.blogspot.com/2007/11/iraqi-minister-council-removeslegal.html; ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 79. For the un-enacted draft bill, see The Law of Subjecting Non-Iraqi
Security Companies and Its Contractors to the Provisions of the Iraqi Law (2007) (never enacted), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/draft_legislation.pdf.
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and Iraq entered into a Status of Forces Agreement (“SOFA”), which remains
in force today.54 While the SOFA attempts to clarify status and jurisdiction of
PCMFs, it created other jurisdictional ambiguities regarding PCMFs.55 Further,
it is unclear whether the SOFA extends jurisdiction ex post facto; Iraq has not
prosecuted any PCMFs for conduct that occurred prior to the enactment of the
SOFA.56
54 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of
United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in
Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008 [hereinafter SOFA].
55 Robert Nichols, New U.S.-Iraq SOFA Lifts Contractor Immunity, 5 INT’L GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 103
(Dec. 2008), available at http://www.crowell.com/documents/New-US-Iraq-SOFA-Lifts-ContractorImmunity.pdf. Essentially, the SOFA fails to regulate all contractors in Iraq, leaving a jurisdictional loophole.
See id. The SOFA states, “Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States
contractors and United States contractor employees.” Id. “United States contractors” and “United States
contractor employees” are defined as follows:

Non-Iraqi persons or legal entities, and their employees, who are citizens of the United States or
a third country and who are in Iraq to supply goods, services, and security in Iraq to or on behalf
of the United States Forces under a contract or subcontract with or for the United States Forces.
Id. (emphasis added). There are several ambiguities in the SOFA. First, “U.S. contractors operating in Iraq
under contract to other U.S. departments/agencies are not subject to the terms of the SOFA.” R. CHUCK
MUNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 40011, U.S.-IRAQ WITHDRAWAL/STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT:
ISSUES FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 7 (2009). This would again exclude firms such as Blackwater, which
were operating under a State Department contract. See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 13. Second, the SOFA
distinguishes between contractors and the “civilian component” of the United States Forces, affording different
jurisdictional rules. See MUNSON, supra, at 7–9. Article 2 of the SOFA states, “‘Member of the civilian
component’ means any civilian employed by the United States Department of Defense.” SOFA, supra note 54,
art. 2, ¶ 4. Therefore, the definitions do not clearly distinguish between a member of the civilian component
and a contractor (assuming the civilian employees are working under a contract as opposed to at-will
employees). One would assume that the difference between the two categories is that the “civilian component”
includes individuals hired directly by the Department of Defense, while the “United States contractors” are
employed by a separate company in conjunction with that company’s contract with the United States.
However, this is neither stated nor immediately apparent from the definitional terms of the SOFA. The issue
becomes significant because the two classes are treated differently with regard to jurisdictional rules. SOFA,
supra note 54, art. 12. “Members of the civilian component” are essentially accorded the same status as the
U.S. military, whereas “United States contractors” are subject to a distinct set of jurisdictional rules. See id.
56 See Legal News: Iraq Parliament Approves SOFA, Still Many Questions Unanswered,
FERALJUNDI.COM (Nov. 27, 2008, 1:31 PM), http://feraljundi.com/2008/11/27/legal-news-iraq-parliamentapproves-sofa-still-many-questions-unanswered/. In Munaf v. Geren, the Supreme Court held that Iraq had
jurisdiction to prosecute criminal charges against two American nationals where the crimes occurred in Iraq
between 2002 and 2004 (before the enactment of the SOFA and partially during the period when CPA Order
No. 17 applied). Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 677, 681 (2008). The facts in this case can be distinguished
from any PCMF misconduct, because both petitioners voluntarily traveled to Iraq as ordinary American
citizens with no special status (e.g., a contractor) and thus CPA Order No. 17 did not prevent them from being
subjected to Iraqi prosecution. See id. at 677. Indeed, the petitioners did not even attempt to argue that CPA
Order No. 17 preempted them from Iraqi justice—instead their argument (which did not persuade the Court)
was based on the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998. Id. at 692.
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Iraq’s interim government publicly expressed its intent to prosecute the
Blackwater operatives for the Nisour Square shootings, stating, “This company
is subject to Iraqi law, and the crime committed was on Iraqi territory, and the
Iraqi judiciary is responsible for tackling the case.”57 However, in keeping with
the trend of legal immunity extended to PCMFs, the contractors were quickly
escorted to the United States.58 Further, CPA Order No. 17 ignored Iraqi
sovereignty, granting Blackwater contractors complete legal immunity from
Iraqi prosecution.59
B. Domestic Prosecution of Blackwater
On December 4, 2008, the United States obtained a grand jury indictment
against five Blackwater employees for their role in the Nisour Square
shootings.60 Specifically, the defendants were charged with fourteen counts of
voluntary manslaughter, twenty counts of attempt to commit manslaughter, one
count of “using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence,” and one count of aiding and abetting.61 The United States
prosecuted the defendants under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
(“MEJA”).62 The defendants argued the United States could not exercise
jurisdiction under the MEJA,63 which creates a status-based jurisdictional
vehicle, by criminalizing offenses by members of the U.S. military and by
persons employed by or accompanying the military outside the territory of the
United States.64 To fall within the parameters of the MEJA, the following
57

SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 14–15.
Id. at 10. A PCMF operative explained that his employer, Triple Canopy, a security and defense
provider, employed an off-the-record strategy for handling PCMF misconduct:
58

We were always told, from the very beginning, if for some reason something happened and they
were trying to prosecute us under Iraqi law, they would put you in the back of a car and sneak
you out of the country in the middle of the night. It was comforting. But we never saw nothin’ on
paper.
STEVE FAINARU, BIG BOY RULES: AMERICA’S MERCENARIES FIGHTING IN IRAQ 19 (2008).
59 See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 49. The immunity could only be waived by the sending state, which
is the United States in this case. The United States has never waived contractor immunity, even in egregious
cases of misconduct.
60 Indictment at 1, United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. CR-08-360) (RMU).
61 Id.
62 See Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Due to Misinstruction
of the Grand Jury Regarding the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act at 1, United States v. Slough, 677 F.
Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. CR-08-360) (RMU).
63 Id. at 13–19.
64 Adam Ebrahim, Note, Going to War with the Army You Can Afford: The United States, International
Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 181, 193 (2010).
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elements must be met: (1) the offense must be punishable by more than a year;
(2) the conduct must occur outside of the United States; (3) the offense must be
committed by a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a person accompanying
the Armed Forces; and (4) the conduct must occur within the scope of the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.65 Congress
amended the MEJA after the Abu Ghraib prison scandals revealed a gaping
jurisdictional loophole as the statute “only applied to civilian contractors
accompanying or employed by the Department of Defense.”66 The 2004
amendment extended U.S. jurisdiction over all contractors employed by “any
other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such
employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense
overseas.”67 Because the defendants’ contract was with the Department of
State, defendants argued they were not supporting the Department of Defense’s
contract and were therefore outside the scope of the statute.68
The D.C. District Court did not rule on the jurisdictional issues, stating that
while the defendants’ jurisdictional arguments were strong, the issue of
whether the Blackwater-State Department contract was “in support” of the
Department of the Defense was subject to a jury determination when the
prosecution presented its case.69 The jury did not make a finding because the
court found pervasive prosecutorial misconduct and dismissed the indictments
against all the defendants.70 The court of appeals, however, vacated the

65 Criminal Offenses Committed by Certain Members of the Armed Forces and by Persons Employed by
or Accompanying the Armed Forces Outside the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a)(1) (2000).
66 Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 193.
67 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (1)(A)(i)–(iii)(II) (2004).
68 Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Due to Misinstruction of
the Grand Jury Regarding the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, supra note 62, at 6.
69 Del Quentin Wilber, Judge Refuses to Dismiss Charges Against Blackwater Guards, WASH. POST,
Feb. 18, 2009, at A5.
70 United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115–16 (D.C.C. 2009). Specifically the court stated:

In their zeal to bring charges against the defendants in this case, the prosecutors and investigators
aggressively sought out statements the defendants had been compelled to make to government
investigators in the immediate aftermath of the shooting and in the subsequent investigation. In
so doing, the government’s trial team repeatedly disregarded the warnings of experienced, senior
prosecutors, assigned to the case specifically to advise the trial team on Garrity and Kastigar
issues, that this course of action threatened the viability of the prosecution . . . In short, the
government has utterly failed to prove that it made no impermissible use of the defendants’
statements or that such use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court must
dismiss the indictment against all of the defendants.
Id. at 115–16. See also ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 83. Matt Apuzzo, Iraq Dismayed by Blackwater
Dismissal: Relative of Civilians Among 17 Killed by U.S. Contractors Calls Judge’s Decision to Dismiss
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judgment and remanded the case, holding that the misconduct did not taint the
evidence presented to the jury in its entirety and that the district court, on
remand, was to sift through the evidence and present any non-tainted evidence
to the jury after a closer analysis.71 Because there is no final judgment in the
Slough case, jurisdiction over the Blackwater contractors under the MEJA
remains questionable.72
II. DO PCMFS FIT WITHIN AN INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK?
This Part examines whether any existing international or domestic
regulatory framework can regulate PCMFs. Specifically, this Part analyzes
international definitions to determine whether they accurately describe the
modern-day PCMF. Additionally, this Part investigates domestic criminal
jurisdictional statutes to examine whether there is a comprehensive
jurisdictional vehicle to encompass PCMF misconduct. The analysis concludes
that both domestic and international law fail to provide either an adequate
definition or jurisdictional mechanism for PCMF misconduct.

Charges a “Farce,” CBS WORLD NEWS (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/01/world/
main6044525.shtml.
Ali al-Dabagh, the Iraqi government spokesman, said in a statement Friday that the government
was dismayed by the court’s dismissal of the case. “The Iraqi government regrets the decision,”
he said. “Investigations conducted by specialized Iraqi authorities confirmed unequivocally that
the guards of Blackwater committed the crime of murder and broke the rules by using arms
without the existence of any threat obliging them to use force.”
Id.
71 United States v. Slough, No. 1:08-cr-00360, 2011 WL 1516148 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2011). The court of
appeals stated, “The district court erred by treating evidence as single lumps and excluding them in their
entirety when at most only some portion of the content was tainted—it made no effort to decide what parts of
the testimony or journal were free from taint.”
72 It is imperative to mention that victims of the Nisour Square shooting and their next-of-kin were
dissatisfied with the terms of their settlement on the civil side. Liz Sly, Iraqis Claim Coercion in Settlement of
Blackwater Shooting Case, Try to Back Out, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/
world/index.ssf/2010/01/01/world/main6044525.shtml. In fact, victims stated that “they were coerced into
reaching settlements and demanded the Iraqi government intervene to have the agreements nullified.” Id.
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A. The International Framework
1. A Brief History and Definition of Mercenarism
“As long as humanity has waged war, there have been mercenaries.”73
Indeed, the reliance on mercenaries to bolster state militaries is not a modern
phenomenon—it is as ancient as war itself.74 “The earliest records of warfare
include numerous mentions of outside fighters being employed to fight for
ancient rulers.”75 The first official historic reference to mercenaries dates back
to 1094–2047 B.C.E., describing mercenaries who served in King Shulgi of
Ur’s army.76 Ranging from Ramses II in the Battle of Kadesh in 1294 B.C.E.,
to Alexander the Great fighting the Persians in 334 B.C.E., and even up to the
British and the American colonies in the Revolutionary War, the use of
professional forces which fight alongside states in exchange for monetary
compensation has remained a consistent element of warfare throughout
history.77 In contrast to soldiers who often serve to prevent wars, mercenaries
benefit from war and “harbor an open commitment to war as a professional
way of life. That is, their occupation entails a certain devotion to war itself, in
that their trade benefits from its existence . . . mercenaries require wars, which
necessarily involves their casting aside a moral attitude toward war.”78
Mercenarism has been such a pervasive element in the history of war that it
has been defined or referred to by the Hague Convention,79 the Geneva
Conventions,80 Protocol I,81 the OUA Convention for the Elimination of

73 Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies,
International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 82 (1998).
74 Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private
Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
75 SINGER, supra note 1, at 20.
76 Id.
77 Milliard, supra note 74, at 4; see also SINGER, supra note 1, at 20–39.
78 SINGER, supra note 1, at 41.
79 Convention between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land arts. 4, 5, 17, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
80 See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].

YASIN GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

7/7/2011 9:29 AM

PLAYING CATCH-UP

425

Mercenarism in Africa,82 and the United Nations (“UN”) Mercenary
Convention.83 Part III of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention defines a
mercenary as any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially for private gain
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or
paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces
of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on
84
official duty as a member of its armed forces.

Thus, applying the definition of mercenary, as stated in part (a), an individual
must be participating in an “armed conflict.”85 Article 2 common to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 states that “the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them.”86 Therefore, the Protocol I definition of
mercenaries presupposes two criteria: (1) an armed conflict; (2) between two
or more nations who are parties to the Geneva Convention.87

81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. It is
important to note that the United States is not a party to Protocol I, but the definition is still pervasive in
international law and thus arguably included in customary international law usage. See, e.g., Kevin H. Govern
& Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: International Law Misses Its Mark (Again), 32
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 55, 70 (2008).
82 Convention of the Organization of African Unity for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa art. 1,
O.A.U. Doc. CM/817(XXIX) Annex II (July 3, 1977).
83 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, G.A.
Res. 44/34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989).
84 Protocol I, supra note 81, art. 47(a).
85 Id.
86 Geneva Convention I, supra note 80, art. 2; Geneva Convention II, supra note 80, art. 2; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 80, art. 2; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 80, art. 2.
87 Daniel P. Ridlon, Contractors or Illegal Combatants? The Status of Armed Contractors in Iraq, 62
A.F. L. REV. 199, 204 (2008).
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2. Mercenaries Distinguished from PCMFs
While similarities between PCMFs and mercenaries admittedly exist in that
PCMFs are not state parties to conflicts and are engaged purely for
remuneration, there are many distinctions that render the term “mercenary”
obsolete in reference to PCMFs. This is generally because war, armed conflict,
combatants, and non-combatants are all legal terms which fail to encompass
the violent reality of post-conflict zones.88 Additionally, the most recent
international “regulations, resolutions, and conventions [were passed] in
response to the mercenary activities in Africa immediately following
decolonization, an environment that no longer exists and only existed for a
short time.”89
Indeed, it would be a legal stretch to attempt to apply the Protocol’s
definition of mercenaries to PCMFs because, as previously mentioned, a
precondition to applying the definition is an armed conflict between nations
that are parties to the Geneva Convention.90 PCMFs became a notable force in
peace-keeping missions during the Serbian-Croatian conflict and remain in
both Iraq and Afghanistan today as part of an ongoing process of peacekeeping and nation-building.91 The Allied Forces’ military presence is not
considered active warfare between two nations party to the Geneva
Convention.92 Because PCMF engagement in post-conflict zones does not rise
to the level of “armed conflict,” PCMFs do not fit within the definition of a
“mercenary.”

88

See discussion infra Part III.B–C and accompanying notes.
Ellen L. Frye, Note, Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining “Mercenary”
Can Tame the “Dogs of War,” 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2639 (2005). The only category of PCMFs which
could be defined as mercenaries is the Military Provider Firm (“MPF”) because they are hired specifically to
take part in hostilities. See infra Part IV.A. Nonetheless, applying the current definition of mercenary to MPFs
would still present a legal challenge because of the non-party state nationality element. Because MPFs are
private corporations, rather than individuals serving independently, it is not difficult for them to change their
nationality relatively quickly and seamlessly. As a result, MPFs could easily circumvent any “mercenary”
regulation by simply registering the corporation in the same state in which the conflict is occurring, and thus
being a national of a participating party. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the definition of mercenaries
would not extend to PCMFs.
90 See Ridlon, supra note 87 and accompanying text. Indeed, President Bush declared the end of all
major military operations, standing in front of a “Mission Accomplished” banner in May 2003. NO END IN
SIGHT, supra note 45.
91 See Gaston, supra note 19, at 236–37, 221–23.
92 Cf. Ridlon, supra note 87, at 229–30 (“[I]n the absence of specific provision or language preventing a
differentiation between being recruited to fight in an armed conflict and being recruited to guard facilities or
individuals, the PMFs would likely not qualify under this element of the definition.”).
89
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Even assuming, arguendo, that an armed conflict exists, the majority of
PCMFs would remain outside the spectrum of the Protocol’s definition of
mercenary. First, many PCMFs are not hired for the purpose of fighting in an
armed conflict and have not participated in hostilities as required by parts (1)
and (2) of the definition of mercenaries.93 Second, a mercenary must
participate in an armed conflict solely for private gain which requires proof of
specific intent.94 This evidentiary requirement presents a significant hurdle to
prosecution because an individual can testify to a different motive.95 Third,
mercenaries cannot be nationals of a party in conflict, or a resident of a
territory controlled by a party in conflict.96 In the case of the operation in Iraq,
this would exclude all American, British, and Iraqi PCMFs, which form a
significant percentage of the total force.97 Because the current internationally
accepted legal definition of mercenaries fails to encompass the amorphous
structure of PCMFs, it is essential to formulate a definition that accords
PCMFs a concise legal status.98
B. Regulation or Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the United States?
Currently, no criminal or civil jurisdictional statute exists to
comprehensively adjudicate PCMF activity.99 As a result, Congress has
repeatedly amended existing legislation to bring PCMFs within a regulatory
framework.100 There are three jurisdictional bases to potentially prosecute

93 Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 211. PCMFs are often part of a security mission or may be performing
logistics and support functions. See discussion, infra Part III.C and accompanying notes.
94 See Ridlon, supra note 87, at 249.
95 Id.
96 Protocol I, supra note 81.
97 Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 211; see Filiz Zabci, Private Military Companies: “Shadow Soldiers” of
Neo-Colonialism, 92 CAPITAL & CLASS 1 (2007), available at http://n.privateforces.com/index.php/
Miscellaneous/private-military-companies-qshadow-soldiersq-of-neo-colonialism.html.
98 Protocol I, supra note 81, art. 47(2). The United Nations has stated that private security guards are
mercenaries and thus fit within the international legal definition because the contractors perform military
duties. Alexander Higgins, U.S. Rejects U.N. Mercenary Report, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2007, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/17/AR2007101701716.html. Nonetheless, the
majority of contractors are from Britain, the United States, and Iraq—and thus, would not be able to be
prosecuted as mercenaries. Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 211; see Zabci, supra note 97.
99 See John S. Kemp, Note, Private Military Firms and Responses to Their Accountability Gap, 32
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 489, 507–08 (2010).
100 See, e.g., Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. 108375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2006)) (amending the MEJA
definition of a person employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L.
107-56, § 804, 115 Stat. 272, 377 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)) (amending the geographic
jurisdiction of the SMTJ).
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PCMF misconduct: the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute
(“SMTJ”);101 the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”);102 and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).103 All three statutes suffer
severe limitations in prosecuting PCMF misconduct and fail to provide a
complete judicial remedy.
1. Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute
The SMTJ was originally passed in 1790 to cover eight specific areas of
jurisdiction.104 Amended in 2001 by the USA PATRIOT Act,105 the SMTJ now
contains a catch-all provision that extends jurisdiction to “any place or
residence in a foreign state used by missions or entities of the U.S. government
with respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United
States.”106 The statute has been used successfully only once in the PCMF
context,107 to prosecute CIA contractor David Passaro, who beat an Afghan
detainee over the course of two days with a flashlight at a military base in
Afghanistan, causing the detainee’s death.108 In this case, Passaro was in a
foreign state (Afghanistan), on a U.S. military base, and Passaro, a U.S.
national, violated the federal criminal assault statute.109 While the SMTJ

101

Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2006).
103 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006).
104 Anthony Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the Law of War:
Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699, 715 (2007). The Special Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction Statute of the United States defines the limits of its jurisdiction for PCMF misconduct:
102

(9) With respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United States as that term
is used in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act—
(A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States
Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and
land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities,
irrespective of ownership; and
(B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, irrespective of
ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or used by United States personnel
assigned to those missions or entities.
18 U.S.C. § 7(9)(A)–(B) (2006).
105 USA PATRIOT Act § 803.
106 Giardino, supra note 104, at 715.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Gleason, 2009 WL 799645 (D. Or. 2009) (finding for the defense after an
unsuccessful prosecution under the SMTJ).
108 Giardino, supra note 104, at 722–23; see also Surabhi Ranganathan, Between Complicity and
Irrelevance? Industry Associations and the Challenge of Regulating Private Security Contractors, 41 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 303, 346 n.181 (2010).
109 Giardino, supra note 104, at 722.
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provided a jurisdictional vehicle to prosecute Passaro,110 the statute cannot
extend its jurisdictional reach over the Nisour Square incident. The SMTJ
requires a relational nexus between: (1) the criminal misconduct; and (2) the
territorial connection with U.S. sovereignty in the place where the conduct
occurred.111 Because the Nisour Square shootings occurred outside the
territorial scope of the SMTJ (there was no military base, consulate, or other
readily identifiable U.S. affiliated structure),112 the misconduct would fall out
of the purview of the SMTJ.
Additionally, the SMTJ only covers “offenses committed by or against a
national of the United States.”113 There are thousands of PCMF contractors in
Iraq that are not U.S. nationals, but may be employed by a PCMF registered in
the United States.114 Again, the SMTJ would fail to regulate these individuals.
2. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
The MEJA is also ill-equipped to prosecute PCMF misconduct. The MEJA
creates a status-based jurisdictional mechanism by criminalizing offenses
perpetrated by members of the Armed Forces and by persons either employed
by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the territory of the United
States.115 In order to fall within the parameters of the MEJA, the following
elements must be met: (1) the offense must be punishable with a sentence of
more than one year;116 (2) the conduct must occur outside the United States;117
(3) the offense must be committed by a member of the Armed Forces or a
person accompanying or employed by the Armed Forces;118 and (4) the
conduct must occur within the scope of “the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.”119 Congress amended the MEJA in 2004 to
close a jurisdictional loophole by including all contractors employed by “any
other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such
employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 722.
See Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (2006).
See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 3–9.
18 U.S.C. § 7.
See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 182–202 (detailing Blackwater’s recruiting operations in Chile).
18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2006); see Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 193.
18 U.S.C. § 3261(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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overseas.”120 Nonetheless, the MEJA also suffers significant territorial
limitations to prosecute PCMF misconduct, as it requires the same territorial
link to the United States as the SMTJ.121
3. Uniform Code of Military Justice
Lastly, the UCMJ, as amended in 2006, includes prosecutorial jurisdiction
over “persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field”
occurring “[i]n time of declared war or a contingency operation.”122 Thus, the
UCMJ theoretically subjects PCMFs, who accompany armed forces in peacekeeping or nation-building missions,123 to military justice. To date, the UCMJ
has not been used to successfully prosecute any PCMFs in military court.124
Furthermore, there is a persuasive argument that such a prosecution would not
withstand constitutional scrutiny, as military law does not provide a Fifth
Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury or a Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury.125 The language of the amendment is vague and over inclusive; it
fails to “differentiate among the various categories of civilians who might be
120

18 U.S.C. §§ 3267(A)(i)(II), (A)(ii)(II), (A)(iii)(II). Following the Nisour Square incident,
the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a resolution that would apply the act to
contractors “where the work . . . is carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area (as
designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency
operation.”

Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 194 (omission in original). While this language would have extended jurisdiction
beyond the U.S. foreign territorial nexus, the language of the House Resolution was not included in the MEJA
amendment, and thus does not have a binding effect. See id. at 194–95. The House Resolution, MEJA
Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, never became law and therefore is not binding. See H.R. 2740, 110th
Congress (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2740.
121 See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (noting the use of “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction”). It is
interesting to note that the Department of Justice attempted to prosecute Blackwater in the United States
District Court of the District of Columbia. While the defendants, in their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction, claimed that MEJA did not include the Nisour Square incident, the defendants based their
argument solely upon the definition of “supporting the mission of the Department of the Defense.” See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
at 16, United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. CR-08-0360) (RMU). A much
stronger argument would have been the territorial link required by the SMTJ. The Court did not address
jurisdictional issues in any of its opinions. See United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115–16 (D.D.C.
2009).
122 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006).
123 Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 196.
124 See Katherine Jackson, Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier: How Five Words Could Subject
Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military Jurisdiction, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
255, 279 (2007); Giardino, supra note 104, at 720.
125 Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability Measures for Private Security
Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 259, 262 (2008).
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accompanying military forces, such as contractors and embedded journalists.
Nor does it distinguish among the various provisions of the UCMJ, meaning
military regulations about sexual orientation or disparaging the commander-inchief could in theory be applied to civilians.”126
In April of 2008, the U.S. military charged Alaa Mohammed Ali with
assault, for stabbing another contractor while working in Anbar Province,
Iraq.127 Previously, the Supreme Court had maintained that military courts
could not extend jurisdiction to civilians in times of peace.128 Because Ali
entered a guilty plea, the court did not analyze any constitutional issues.129 Due
to the likelihood of a successful constitutional challenge,130 the UCMJ does not
provide a reliable mechanism to prosecute PCMFs.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE PCMF ENTITY
This Part examines the convergence of three novel legal developments: (1)
the ambiguous form of twenty-first century warfare; (2) the outsourcing of
state monopoly over the use of force; and (3) the rising influence of
transnational corporations. First, this Part analyzes the geo-political power
vacuum which facilitated the creation of a privatized military force. Second,
this Part discusses the factors which led to the growth of the industry. Third,
the PCMF’s role in conflict and post-conflict zones is examined as part of a
growing problem where legal lexicon fails to reflect the reality of warfare.
Fourth, this Part discusses the problems inherent in outsourcing military
operations and the larger issue of the privatization of traditional state roles.
Fifth, there is an examination of the role of for-profit transnational
corporations in conflict resolution and nation-building. Finally, this Part
discusses the intersection of these novel issues creating the PCMF conceptual
confusion.

126

Id.
Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 197.
128 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that the wife of a service member could not be tried by
a military court for a capital crime committed during peacetime); cf. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363,
364 (1970) (stating the court found “nothing in [O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969)] that causes us to
conclude a civilian accompanying the armed forces in the field in time of a declared war is invulnerable to trial
by military courts”). These fact patterns are distinguishable, but the same concerns for Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections remain applicable.
129 Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 197–98.
130 Id. at 196 (“[T]he modification appears ripe for a constitutional challenge on due process, vagueness,
and over-inclusiveness grounds.”).
127
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A. The Origins and Rise of PCMFs
The modern PCMF industry emerged in the early 1990’s131 as a byproduct
of the fall of the Soviet Union, which created a “geopolitical power
vacuum.”132 During the Cold War, the two superpowers dominated the scene,
intervening in local and regional conflicts and providing order and stability by
strictly controlling trouble spots.133 The Cold War disengagement catalyzed a
complementary economic and military marriage, caused by: (1) an oversupply
of military professionals and equipment; and (2) an increased demand for
private security forces in weak or emerging states.134 The private sector seized
the opportunity to engage a truly global market, creating a quasi-military
industry capable of deploying transnationally. The industry focused marketing
to weak or failing states with little or no centralized military.135 Over time,
outsourcing both logistical support as well as military and security functions
formed a highly lucrative burgeoning market.136
Currently, in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of PCMFs is astonishingly
greater than the number of troops.137 As of March of 2009, contractors made
up fifty-seven percent of the total force in Afghanistan138 and, by September of
2007, there were approximately 180,000 contractors supporting 160,000 U.S.
soldiers in Iraq.139 These numbers do not provide a reliable estimate of the total
number of contractors in Iraq, which is in fact much higher.140 Between fiscal
years 2003 and the first half of 2008, Congress had apportioned $106 billion

131

Gaston, supra note 18, at 224.
Zarate, supra note 73, at 76.
133 Id.; see also SINGER, supra note 1, at 50.
134 SINGER, supra note 1, at 49–53. Weak and emerging states include many African countries with
unstable governments and diffuse unorganized militaries as well as the Balkan states, which are emerging
through principles of self-determination. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD
ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2004).
135 See Gaston, supra note 19, at 224.
136 See id. at 225–26. Both state and non-state actors employ PCMFs in weak or failing states. See
AVANT, supra note 30, at 37.
137 James Glanz, Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at A10;
see also Jeremy Scahill, Obama Has 250,000 “Contractors” in Iraq and Afghan Wars, Increases Number
of Mercenaries, REBEL REPORTS (June 1, 2010), http://rebelreports.com/post/116277092/obama-has-250-000contractors-in-iraq-and-afghan.
138 Glanz, supra note 137, at A10; see also Ridlon, supra note 87, at 202.
139 SINGER, supra note 1, at 245. “Even this figure was thought by officials [at the Department of
Defense] to be low, because a number of the biggest companies, as well as firms employed by the Department
of State or other agencies or NGOs, were not included in the census.” Id.
140 Id.
132
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for private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.141 While these statistics are
staggering, they reveal an inescapable reality: PCMFs are an indispensable
component of modern warfare and nation-building; in other words, they are
here to stay.142 “[T]he fact that the US (with defense expenditures greater than
the next twenty-four countries combined and roughly one percent of the Gross
World Product, GWP) has embraced private security solutions guarantees
strong state demand, demand that is increasingly joined by the UK and other
western states.”143
Senator Lindsey Graham astutely predicted “the use of private contractors
‘is the way we are going to war in the future.’”144 The data, even in its
incomplete form, confirms his statement.145 Those who argue that the PCMF
industry should be comprehensively eradicated are ignoring the degree to
which the military and PCMF industry are intertwined, to the extent that, in
some cases, the military is completely reliant upon them.146 Additionally, the
reality is military training, knowledge, and in some cases combat itself, have
become valuable commodities in modern warfare and can be readily bought
and sold on the open global market.147

141
142

Id.
See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 159. Fainaru adds the following:
It had started small, a byproduct of all the mistakes at the beginning: not enough troops, ignoring
the insurgency, starting the reconstruction prematurely. Soon they were everywhere: guarding the
diplomats, the generals, military bases the size of small cities, and thousands of supply convoys
filled with guns and ammunition and food. Suddenly no one and no thing could move around Iraq
without them. Some human rights groups had mercs [mercenaries]. The media had mercs. The
International Republican Institute, chaired by John McCain, and the National Democratic
Institute, chaired by Madeleine Albright, used mercs to spread democracy. The Iraqi politicians
had them full time and the American politicians had them whenever the delegations came
through to find out how the war was going. The market was so hot it became known as the “Iraq
Bubble.” The demand to be safe never stopped, so neither did the supply. The mercs came from
the army, navy, air force, marines, from small-town police departments and the LAPD. And from
other nations’ armies: the British SAS, the Australian Defence Forces, the Nepalese Gurkhas.
One Peruvian I met swore that there were ex-members of the Shining Path in Iraq, the terrorists
who had massacred thousands of peasants during the eighties and early nineties. Terrorists
fighting terrorists.

FAINARU, supra note 58, at 22–23.
143 AVANT, supra note 30, at 38.
144 Govern & Bales, supra note 81, at 56 (quoting Lydia Gensheimer, War Zone Crimes: Accountability
MIA, 66 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1230, 1232 (2008)).
145 See Glanz, supra note 137, at A10.
146 See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 155–56.
147 Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary
Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 (1999).
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B. Factors Leading to the Growth of PCMFs in Iraq
Commentators who argue for the complete elimination of PCMFs neglect
many pertinent facts. A core problem the United States faced in rebuilding Iraq
was an insufficient number of troops.148 While several potential political and
military solutions were available, they were all discarded as “politically
unpalatable.”149 Because the U.S. Army, following an ongoing trend, failed to
meet enlistment quotas, the military had to bridge the gap between forces
available and forces required, short of calling for a mandatory draft.150 PCMFs
provided this “force surge” without the corresponding political cost.151
Furthermore, because the mission in Iraq was subject to great disdain by
the American public, the U.S. government sought to reduce the number of
military casualties in Iraq.152 Contractor casualties are not included in the
official death tolls of the military; in fact, the deaths of contractors have been
approached as a “positive externality” that fails to publicly reveal the actual

148 NO END IN SIGHT, supra note 45. In February of 2003, one month prior to the invasion of Iraq, General
Shinseki of the U.S. Army projected Operation Iraqi Freedom would require several hundred thousand troops.
Id. This recommendation was basically unheeded by the administration. Id. To fill the gap, the administration
began to outsource heavily all non-offensive military work. Steve Fainaru, Iraq Contractors Face Growing
Parallel War, WASH. POST, June 16, 2007, at A11.
149 SINGER, supra note 1, at 244.
150 Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 42.
151 Id. Journalist Steve Fainaru aptly describes how the United States became so entangled with PCMFs:

A government launches a preemptive war predicated on a myth. Insurgents rise up to
confront the occupiers. Lacking a sufficient fighting force, not to mention political will, the
government rents itself a private army, piece by piece. Hundreds of companies form overnight,
like mushrooms after a rainstorm, some with boards of directors and glass offices, others that are
scarcely more than armed gangs. The companies hire from a vast pool of veterans and ex-cops,
adrenaline junkies, escapees from the rat race, the patriotic, the greedy, the terminally and
perpetually bored. They hire Americans and Brits, South Africans and Aussies, Fijians and
Gurkhas. Peruvians who fought the Shining Path. Colombians fresh from the drug wars. They
give them weapons (although many bring their own) and turn them loose on an arid battlefield
the size of California, without rules, without laws, with little to guide them except their
conscience.
Soon it’s a $100 billion industry, an industry of arms, with unions and lobbyists and its own
tortured nomenclature: in newsprint and polite conversation, they are all “private security
contractors.
FAINARU, supra note 58, at xiv–v.
152 See Fainaru, supra note 148, at A11 (quoting a former U.S. director for logistics in Iraq as calling
security contractors “the unsung heroes of the war,” saying “she believed the military wanted to hide
information showing that private guards were fighting and dying in large numbers because it would be
perceived as bad news”). In fact, a New York Times report in May 2007 reported that “for every four American
soldiers who die in Iraq, a contractor is killed.” ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 12.
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cost of war.153 “The U.S. military has never released complete statistics on
contractor casualties or the number of attacks on privately guarded convoys,”
nor on PCMF misconduct.154 Substituting PCMFs for military personnel
allows the government to continue a politically unfavorable war without
exposing the comprehensive human cost.155
Lastly, proponents of PCMFs use market efficiency arguments and
proclaim a reduction in overall wartime spending.156 Whether the use of
PCMFs in warfare and nation-building is prudent on a policy level is
irrelevant—it is clear that PCMFs have become inextricably linked with war
and post-conflict, nation-building activities.157 As the number of employed
PCMFs rises, the potential for grave violations of international law increases,
making it imperative to determine the legal status of PCMFs operating in these
contexts.
C. Definitional Abysses
The use of a twentieth century legal lexicon to define novel twenty-first
century problems further compounds the inefficacy in regulating PCMFs. For
example, “[i]nternational and domestic law take as a basic premise the notion
that it is possible, important, and usually fairly straightforward to distinguish
between war and peace, emergencies and normality, the foreign and the
domestic, the external and the internal.”158 The codification of international
and domestic law of armed conflict began in the West in the nineteenth
153 SINGER, supra note 1, at 245. “Bluntly put: if you are not on active duty in the U.S. military—even if
you were for 10 to 20 years previously—and even if you are contributing to the war effort, nobody beyond
your immediate family cares if you get killed.” ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 13.
154 Fainaru, supra note 148, at A11. Furthermore, in July 2006, a federal judge held that the U.S.
government “can keep secret the names of private security contractors involved in serious shooting incidents in
Iraq.” ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 12.
155 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 12–14.
156 See Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 42. The statistical evidence shows that the opposite is true.
PCMF contracts show case after case of mushrooming costs, corruption, and abuse due to lack of oversight.
ALLISON STANGER, ONE NATION UNDER CONTRACT 3, 9 (2009). “[O]ne Iraqi former chief investigator
testified before Congress in September 2008 that $13 billion in reconstruction funds from the United States
had gone walking.” Id. at 9.
157 IRAQ FOR SALE (Brave New Films 2009). As of 2005, Halliburton had received a $18.5 billion contract
for reconstruction and troop support, Parsons had received a $5.3 billion contract for engineering and
construction, DynCorp International had received a $1.9 billion contract for police training, Transatlantic
Traders had received a $5 million contract for surveillance aircraft, Titan received a $2 billion contract, and
CACI received a $19.25 billion for translation services. Id. This is by no means a comprehensive list. In fact,
“forty cents out of every dollar that Congress controls goes to contractors.” Id.
158 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed
Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2004).
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century; however, in light of the “war on terrorism” and “preemptive wars,”
these definitions fail to regulate the range of violent conflict that occurs in
modern times.159 Indeed, “globalization has complicated once-straightforward
legal categories, but this is nowhere more apparent and more troubling than in
the realm[] of armed conflict.”160
Global actors, traditional warfare, and temporal and geographic lines are all
categories and terms the definitions of which have become undeniably hazy in
the past decade:
The new threat environment has been heralded (from the right and
the left) as bringing with it new forms of warfare and the merging of
security with a variety of other economic and political forms. Thus,
‘national’ security has become difficult to distinguish from
international or global security and the lines between internal and
161
external security have blurred.

Furthermore, as one commentator poignantly articulates:
The existence of reasonably clear boundaries between conflict and
nonconflict, combatants and noncombatants, and “lawful” and
“unlawful” belligerents is what allows us to determine which legal
rules apply in different situations, and, even more critically, allows us
to identify people and rights meriting protection. As traditional
categories lose their logical underpinnings, we are entering a new era:
the era of War Everywhere. It is an era in which the legal rules that
were designed to protect basic rights and vulnerable groups have lost

159 Id. at 686–87. Specifically, in 1856, the Conference of Paris sought to formulate rules governing naval
warfare. Id. at 688. In 1863, during the American Civil War, the U.S. Army issued military rules of
engagement of the armed forces. Id. These rules were based on the recommendations of Francis Lieber and the
Lieber Code, and “laid out basic rules concerning permissible and impermissible methods of warfare,
including rules relating to the treatment of civilians.” Id. That same year, Swiss citizen Henry Dunant founded
the International Committee of the Red Cross for the express purpose of providing humanitarian aid to those
“wounded in wartime by [the] zealous.” Id. at 688–89. Dunant urged European states to codify acceptable and
unacceptable conduct in warfare. Id. at 689. In response, in 1864, ten European states ratified the First Geneva
Convention. Id. “[I]n 1899 and 1907, international peace conferences at The Hague led to the drafting and later
entry into force of the various Hague Conventions on the laws and customs of war.” Id. at 689. In the interwar
period, the United States and fourteen other nations entered into the Kellogg-Briand Pact making it illegal to
wage “war for the solution of international controversies.” Id. After World War II, the UN Charter formally
instituted “the prohibition on waging aggressive war.” Id. The process to define and constrain armed conflict
has continued to modern time. Id. at 690. In 1974, the UN General Assembly defined “aggression” in the
context of armed conflict, and in 1977 two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention were promulgated
and widely ratified. Id. at 690.
160 Id. at 677.
161 Id.; AVANT, supra note 30, at 33.
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much of their analytical force, and thus, too often, their practical
162
force.

Terms which have heretofore conveyed status and denoted privileges in times
of war are no longer easily decipherable. Put another way, there have been
conventions, treaties, declarations, and tribunals dedicated to regulating the
law that governs armed conflict.163 However, inherent in this regulation is
something so obvious that many of us rarely pause to consider it: “it
presupposes the idea that ‘armed conflict’ is definable and identifiable, and
reasonably easily distinguishable from its opposite—nonconflict, or, in more
common parlance, peace.”164 In a time of armed conflict, so long as the armed
conflict itself is legal, it is permissible to use offensive force to kill large
numbers of human beings, which, absent the express denotation of “armed
conflict,” would be considered mass murder.165 It is only within this context
that “[t]he principle of combatant immunity” arises.166 “In peacetime, the
willful killing of another human would normally lead to prosecution, trial, and
possibly conviction for the crime of murder. During and after wars, however,
soldiers cannot be prosecuted for killing enemy combatants; their deadly
violence is legally immunized.”167 Consequently, “the law of armed conflict
provides that combatants taken prisoner by opposing forces may be detained
until the cessation of hostilities, but they may not be subject to punishment by
opposing forces for their legitimate wartime acts, and they must be released
and repatriated when hostilities end.”168 Furthermore, “[i]t is something of a
truism that international human rights and humanitarian law does not generally
bind non-state actors in most cases.”169 The international community, in
formulating the laws governing warfare and human rights over the last century,
had not anticipated the creation and pervasiveness of the PCMF industry
within both conflict and post-conflict zones (neither of which rise to the level
of “armed conflict”), which has resulted in both a conceptual and
corresponding legal abyss in providing for regulations and accountability
standards for the industry.170
162

Brooks, supra note 158, at 681–82.
See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 79.
164 Brooks, supra note 158, at 702.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 692.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 161 (2005).
170 Id. at 162–63.
163
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Discussing the manner in which these categories should be re-conceived
and redefined to better reflect modern realities is beyond the scope of this
Article. Nonetheless, the issue certainly serves to illustrate the macrocosm of
definitional problems plaguing modern-day warfare or conflict zones, which,
in turn, is personified by its nebulous microcosm counterpart—the PCMF
industry. PCMFs do not easily fit within the current framework of the welldeveloped body of laws regarding warfare and human rights because they are
not soldiers, and typically engage in post-conflict zones.171 While the scope of
this Article is limited to defining a new international actor and establishing a
framework for this industry alone, the definitional problem is noteworthy
because the entire dialogue hinges on “[c]onfusing entities in the midst of a
confusing form of war, in a confusing time” which necessitates “some attempt
at establishing conceptual clarity.”172
D. Privatizing State Power
Renowned sociologist and philosopher Max Weber defines the state as “a
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory.”173 The implicit assumption in
the Westphalian based international order recognizes states as the primary
actors, particularly in the realm of the use of violence.174 Nonetheless, the
United States, following a trend of privatizing governmental tasks, has also
extended outsourcing to traditional military functions.175 “In the twentieth
century, business and government were adversaries. Today, the wall between
the two that may have once existed has become a revolving door, and both
share common interests.”176
Originally introduced as a Bureau of the Budget Bulletin during the
Eisenhower Administration, Office of Management and Budget Circular
Number A-76 (“A-76”)177 was created to identify non-essential governmental
171
172

ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 7, 29.
KATERI CARMOLA, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

AND

NEW WARS: RISK, LAW

AND

ETHICS 11

(2010).
173

STANGER, supra note 156, at 45.
Id.
175 See id. at 46–47. (“The U.S. government has itself played an active role in reconfiguring authority
through its outsourcing, but the forces are much larger than government choice. No longer able to attain its
objectives solely by armed force, the United States now relies heavily on private security companies to
advance its interests.”).
176 Id. at ix.
177 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR. NO. A-76 (Revised)
(2003).
174
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tasks and allow the private sector to compete with the government to do the job
more efficiently.178 A-76 was tabled during the Vietnam War, but revived as
the fervor of privatization rose under the Reagan administration.179 The 1983
A-76 revision stated:
In the process of governing, the Government should not compete
with its citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by
individual freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national
economic strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been and
continues to be the general policy of the Government to rely on
commercial sources to supply the products and services the
180
Government needs.

Under President Reagan, “the privatization impulse also extended to foreign
policy.”181 Thus, when Congress stopped funding the rebel Contra movement
in Nicaragua, Reagan’s National Security Council simply outsourced the job to
private contractors, with “wholly disastrous consequences.”182
Privatization is a bipartisan phenomenon; in 1998, “[t]he Clinton
administration promulgated the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (“FAIR”)
Act,”183 requiring “federal agencies to submit annual inventories of their
commercial activities.”184 Under the Act, agencies were tasked with identifying
work that could be transferred to the private sector to “encourage smart
outsourcing.”185 This left agencies to determine which activities were core
functions, or “inherently governmental,” and thus could not be outsourced, in
contrast to peripheral functions which were “candidates for outsourcing to the
private sector.”186 “Inherently governmental” roles are defined as performing a
“function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require
performance by federal government employees.”187 Thus, agency officials
were indirectly charged with examining the role of government and the private

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

STANGER, supra note 156, at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
Id.; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 177.
STANGER, supra note 156, at 15.
Id.
Id.; Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (1998).
STANGER, supra note 156, at 15 (referring to Section 2a of the FAIR Act).
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act § 2(a)–(d); STANGER, supra note 156, at 15.
STANGER, supra note 156, at 15.
Id. at 16.
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sector.188 It is no surprise that the activities deemed “inherently governmental”
have reduced significantly, leading to a blur of public and private roles.189
This blurring of lines is most apparent in the PCMF context. While the
government has continued an increasing trend of outsourcing contracts to
private corporations to provide and manage domestic services such as welfare,
health care, education, and prison management, this trend has taken a strange,
Orwellian turn with the unprecedented privatization of military power.190
Economist Milton Friedman wrote, “[t]he basic functions of government are to
defend the nation against foreign enemies, to prevent coercion of some
individuals by others within the country, to provide a means of deciding on our
rules, and to adjudicate disputes.”191 Thus, the quintessential role of
government is to fight wars; however, it is this very function that has been
outsourced to the private sector by way of the PCMF industry. In an eerily
foreshadowing speech, on September 10, 2001, the day before the 9/11 attacks,
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech to 23,000 Pentagon
employees, stated the following:
The topic today is an adversary that poses a threat, a serious
threat, to the security of the United States of America. This adversary
is one of the world’s last bastions of central planning. It governs by
dictating five-year plans. From a single capital, it attempts to impose
its demands across time zones, continents, oceans and beyond. With
brutal consistency, it stifles free thought and crushes new ideas. It
disrupts the defense of the United States and places the lives of men
and women in uniform at risk.
Perhaps this adversary sounds like the former Soviet Union, but
that enemy is gone: our foes are more subtle and implacable today.
You may think I’m describing one of the last decrepit dictators of the
world. But their day, too, is almost past, and they cannot match the
strength and size of this adversary. The adversary’s closer to home.
It’s the Pentagon bureaucracy. Not the people, but the processes. Not
the civilians, but the systems. Not the men and women in uniform,
but the uniformity of thought and action that we too often impose on
them. . . .
Why is DOD one of the last organizations around that still cuts
its own checks? When an entire industry exists to run warehouses
efficiently, why do we own and operate so many of our own? At

188
189
190
191

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 389 (2006).
STANGER, supra note 156, at 26.
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bases around the world, why do we pick up our own garbage and
mop our own floors, rather than contracting services out, as many
businesses do? And surely we can outsource more computer systems
support.
Maybe we need agencies for some of those functions. Indeed, I
know we do. Perhaps a public-private partnership would make sense
for others, and I don’t doubt at least a few could be outsized—
192
outsourced altogether.

In January of 2002, Rumsfeld demanded military leaders “to behave somewhat
less like bureaucrats and more like venture capitalists.”193 This military
privatization ideology was then put into practice during and after the Iraq
war.194 The paramount challenge of outsourcing force is to reconceive “how
international law is to function in a world where power has been privatized.”195
In democratic states such as the United States, “the People” are the ultimate
sovereign, with “Congress and president [serving as] her agents.”196 However,
when the monopoly on the use of force is removed from direct state control,
for example with PCMFs, there are two problems: (1) the lack of democratic
accountability over the use of force, which is inseparable from the very
concept of statehood; and (2) the regulatory and legal gap these non-state
actors fall within create “the perfect conditions for all variants of corruption
and abuse of power.”197 Therefore, when states privatize the use of force, there
must be some corresponding avenue to regulate and prosecute entities to
account for the reduction in transparency and control.198

192

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def., DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week
Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield (Sept. 10, 2001).
193 STANGER, supra note 156, at 86 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def., Remarks at
National Defense University (Jan. 31, 2002)).
194 Id. at 87.
195 Id. at 42.
196 PAUL VERUKIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 15 (2007).
197 STANGER, supra note 156, at 18.
198 See AVANT, supra note 30, at 48 (“[T]here are basic differences between profit-seeking contractors
and civil servants: profit seekers, in exchange for a price, deliver a product; while civil servants, in exchange
for a wage, agree to accept instructions. . . . [I]f the government cares about means and wants its agents to
follow a set of guidelines for how to go about providing a service, civil servants—geared to follow
instructions—are superior.”).
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E. The Rise of Transnational Corporations
The outsourcing of state functions coincides with the declining relevance of
the nation-state and the rising impact of transnational corporations (“TNCs”)
globally; indeed the role of a TNC in influence and effect has been likened to
that of a state or NGO.199 In fact, “the most recent figures [reveal that] 77,000
TNCs span the global economy today, with some 770,000 subsidiaries and
millions of suppliers. . . . [TNCs] operate in more countries than ever before,
and increasingly in socio-political contexts that pose entirely novel human
rights challenges for them.”200 Furthermore, “[t]he annual earnings of many
transnational conglomerates (especially those in the energy, manufacturing,
retailing, and information technology sectors) exceed the gross domestic
product (GDP) of many nations in not just the developing world, but also the
industrialized North.”201 TNCs’ reach is not limited to economic or market
forces, rather they “are able to engage in many of the activities and functions
we associate with the traditional nation-state: market-making and regulation,
intelligence gathering, social welfare programs (for their employees and other
stakeholders), and even self-defense in the form of corporate security units.”202
PCMFs are organized as corporate structures, hiring employees globally,
oftentimes with offices worldwide.203 The corporate structure provides both
fluidity and liability protection for the PCMF entity; they “can rapidly dissolve
and recreate themselves as need be.”204 PCMFs utilize subsidiaries and
counterparts to avoid state regulation and move elsewhere, if required.205 Thus,
while PCMFs perform military-like functions associated with states, they
maintain a highly fluid corporate facade. This again complicates the issue of
how to define PCMFs, as they are organized entities, performing state

199

See generally Allison D. Garret, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129 (2008) (discussing
the implications of the corporation as a nation-state); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The
Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931
(2004) (discussing the need for TNCs to be recognized on an international level for accountability reasons).
200 John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda 6–7 (John. F. Kennedy
Sch. of Gov’t, Harv. Univ., Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 38, 2007), available
at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_38_ruggie.pdf.
201 David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational Governance, 57 EMORY L.J. 201, 208
(2007).
202 Id.
203 CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 30. See generally ISENBERG, supra note 22 (discussing the PCMFs in
Iraq).
204 AVANT, supra note 30, at 67.
205 Id.
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functions, rather than independent contractors working individually.206 The
paramount legal question is how to regulate private corporate entities, which
provide state-based military functions. The clear answer is that there must be
some framework which recognizes the unique attributes of the PCMF and
accordingly attaches status and legal accountability thereto.
F. The Convergence of Three Variables
PCMFs are hybrid, polymorphous entities which are “protean” in nature,
combining “the worlds of the military, the business world, and the
humanitarian NGO in unfamiliar ways.”207 PCMFs are difficult to
conceptualize and regulate because they “combine organizational cultures that
in many cases have defined themselves in opposition to one another.”208 The
military, for example, maintains a distinct separate culture in terms of its
traditional hierarchical command and control, formalized ceremony,
procedure, and regulation.209 Indeed, “Supreme Court decisions have long
‘recognized [the military as a] specialized society separate from civilian
society with laws and traditions of its own.’”210 Within this disciplined
environment, soldiers are trained to die and kill others, but under the formal
direction of state-based civilian leadership.211 The organizational
characteristics of the military lay in stark contrast to those of private, for-profit
corporations.212 Private corporations are created and sustained by business
models of production and profitability.213 Corporations seek to maximize
efficiencies, which in turn produce a profit, and thus are not beholden to public

206

Id. at 37–38 (discussing the difficulty inherent to defining transnational corporations).
CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 27.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 32.
210 Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975)).
211 Id. at 33. Theoretically, the civilian leadership will restrain violence and thus only employ the military
when thought completely necessary. Id. This provides democratic accountability and legitimizes force only in
certain constrained situations. See id. at 32–33.
212 FAINARU, supra note 58, at 33.
207

The military, for all its rigidity, was a culture of rules and accountability. That had been stripped
away. In private security, Sheppard explained to me, “You got all the good things about the
military—the camaraderie, the esprit de corps, you get to shoot things and blow things up—but
with none of the other bullshit.” Schmidt said there were never any rules of engagement, the
bedrock for determining whether a shooting was justified. . . . “The rules of engagement, the way
they were briefed to me, was, ‘If you feel threatened, take a shot.’”
Id.
213

CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 30–31.
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opinion or public interest.214 As such, corporations are responsible primarily to
shareholders and to clients to provide the goods and services for which they
were sought.215 Corporate structures do not employ the formality or
organizational hierarchy that militaries employ.216 Lastly, humanitarian
organizations define themselves in virtual diametric opposition to both military
and business cultures.217 The humanitarian culture aspires to achieve
transnational goals.218 “The ideals that guide the actions of the humanitarian
organization and their members are often described in trans-political and
universal terms: human security, human rights, and basic needs for shelter and
healthcare.”219 While the organizational qualities of militaries, businesses, and
humanitarian groups are not entirely mutually exclusive, they are not
conceptually complementary, resulting in conceptual disarray.220 Prominent
commentator Kateri Carmola summarizes the PCMF conundrum stating:
The combination of three entities—a profitable corporate business
working as a military force-multiplier with a mission construed in
humanitarian terms—exacerbates the conceptual confusion that
surrounds [PCMFs]. In the legal realm, this conceptual confusion has
serious consequences: the legal status of [PCMFs] and their
contractors is hard to pin down, and efforts to regulate these
companies fail to provide a recognizable, legal identity. The world of
international and military law, which begins by dividing the battle
space into combatants and non-combatants, soldiers and civilians,
and inter-state or intra-state conflicts, is severely challenged when
221
such complex organizations become major players in these zones.

“The critical first step toward any successful policy is to broaden the
understanding of the issue at hand. Heightened appreciation is required of the
[PCMFs] potential and its underlying dynamics and challenges.”222 Indeed,
“[w]e do not know how to judge what we cannot understand, and existing
categories of classification and judgment fall short. The fault here is with us,
not them; we are stuck with outdated ways of seeing, and need to adapt.”223

214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223

Id. at 31.
Id.
See id. at 32 (describing the culture of the military and that of business as “diametrically opposed”).
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 234.
CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 12.
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Therefore, in order to regulate PCMFs, this Article seeks to categorize and
define the industry appropriately.
IV. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF PCMFS
The determination of which laws regulate an entity or a person requires a
status-based definitional inquiry.224 In the PCMF context, there is no scholarly
consensus on even the most fundamental questions, such as a uniform
terminology or nomenclature, further illustrating an underlying lack of
conceptual clarity regarding the PCMF entity. 225 Originally, the industry used
the term “private military firm,” but this became problematic, from a public
relations point of view, as it highlighted offensive military capabilities.226
Following this, the industry tried to rebrand itself as “private security
companies” to downplay the military nature of their services.227 Currently,
many have used the term “private military security companies” (“PMSCs”),
combining the elements of the other two names.228 Industry leaders have tried
to brand themselves as “peace and stability operators” in “contingency
operations.”229 This Article refers to the industry as “privately contracted
military firms” to highlight the three essential, defining characteristics of the
PCMF: the organizations are (1) privately held corporations; (2) employed
under a contractual arrangement; (3) performing traditional military duties.230
PCMFs are not a homogenous group; they offer a wide range of services to
the military. This Article creates an analytical framework for PCMFs by
accounting for and analyzing the hybrid, quasi-public, quasi-private, corporatemilitary organizational, and institutional characteristics. Furthermore, this
Article devises sub-categories of PCMFs based on the services offered. It is
possible that a firm will provide an array of services allowing it to fit into the
framework of multiple categories; categories are not mutually exclusive.231 It
must be acknowledged at the outset that classifying the PCMF industry has
proved to be extremely complex. Scholars have attempted to categorize, but
“few generally accepted definitions exist, even of the most basic terms.”232
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232

See id. at 9–11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 88.
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Scholars have used the terms “active” and “passive” or “armed” and
“unarmed” to provide parameters of classification, but these labels ignore the
vast differences that exist between PCMFs in scope and objective.233 Peter
Singer, a leading scholar in the PCMF field, suggests recognizing the dual
qualities of PCMFs, acknowledging both military and economic fundamentals
that characterize PCMFs.234 Therefore, the most effective way to structure the
PCMF industry is by classifying the firm based on the range of services
offered.235 Employing a military analogy known as “tip of the spear,”236 which
differentiates units based on their proximity to actual fighting, proves most
effective in categorizing PCMFs.237 There are six basic broad services that
PCMFs offer. Ordering firms from those performing functions most similar to
a traditional military to the least, the classification is as follows: (1) Military
Provider Firms;238 (2) Military Security or Defense Firms;239 (3) Military
Intelligence Firms;240 (4) Military Consultant Firms;241 (5) Military Logistic
Firms;242 and (6) Military Support Firms.243
A. Military Provider Firms
Military Provider Firms (“MPFs”) are characterized by their complete
tactical involvement in military operations on behalf of state or non-state
actors.244 These firms provide combat services such as engaging in actual

233

Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 91.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Peter Singer has identified three broad categories of PCMFs—the Military Provider Firm, Military
Consultant Firm, and the Military Support Firm. Id. at 88–100. Singer’s book, Corporate Warriors, was first
published in 2003 and detailed PCMFs that had mainly performed in the ‘90s in Africa and then later in the
Balkans. PETER SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (1st ed.
2003). At that time, the PCMF industry had just arrived on the scene. SINGER, supra note 1, at vii. Since then,
there has been significant development in the range of services PCMFs provide and the environment in which
they operate. Id. As such, this Article seeks to identify and further refine the categories that should exist to
determine legal status, and those which have already been created. Along these lines, it is also interesting to
recognize that in less than a decade, PCMFs have both expanded and mutated in ways that were difficult to
anticipate. Id. at 230–42. This provides even more of a rationale to use both international and domestic venues
to aptly define these polymorphous bodies and attach legal statuses accordingly.
238 Id. at 92–95.
239 See infra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
240 See infra note 320.
241 SINGER, supra note 1, at 95–97.
242 See id. at 144.
243 Id. at 97–100.
244 Id. at 92.
234
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fighting on the battlefield or directly commanding military units in battle.245
MPFs can serve two possible functions: (1) as a comprehensive private
military force; or (2) as a force multiplier.246 In the first instance, “the firm
provides the client a stand-alone tactical military unit.”247 This type of MPF is
uncommon, but has been sought and used in the PCMF marketplace.248 The
latter, more common type of MPF, or “force multiplier,” provides tactical
advantages for ill-equipped militaries which engage in broad conflicts.249 This
MPF joins the client and participates in its conflicts by combining forces,
thereby increasing the size of the total force.250 Clients seek to employ force
multipliers primarily for their “skills at battlefield assessment, management,
and coordination.”251 They perform the function of “mini-generals,” providing
the expertise of former professional military commanders.252 Additionally, the
MPF often provides specialized services and equipment, such as flying
advanced fighter jets or operating artillery control systems.253 Because of this
specialization in warfare and equipment, even clients with relatively strong
militaries may hire MPFs in order to obtain a full-scale tactical advantage on
all fields.254 A primary example of a highly specialized MPF is Executive
Outcomes (“EO”). EO is an MPF which was originally founded in 1989 by
Eben Barlow, a former assistant commander of the 32nd Battalion of the South
African Defence Force.255 This elite strike force has been “accused of
egregious human rights violations by the South African Truth Commission.”256
The corporate structure was particularly crucial to EO’s operations and
contracts; specifically, EO was a subsidiary of Strategic Resources
245

Id.
Id. at 93.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 94.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. The modern MPF most closely resembles the definition of mercenary in international law. See, e.g.,
id. at 42, 92–95. MPFs embody the modern definition of a mercenary because of their focus on direct combat,
use of units with smaller manpower, and more flexible “virtual structure.” Id. These MPFs, while not
completely obsolete, seem to be highly uncommon. See, e.g., id. at 117–18. The climate in Africa in the 1990s,
post-colonization, provided several variables simultaneously which necessitated a large-scale private military
force, including weak central governments with effectively no military force coupled with a power vacuum.
See id. at 102–14; Zarate, supra note 73, at 94–97 (describing how MPF Executive Outcomes was successful
in Angola and Sierra Leone). Because these variables no longer exist in Africa, a full-scale private military
would be looked upon unfavorably by the international community. See Zarate, supra note 73, at 138–39.
255 SINGER, supra note 1, at 102.
256 Id.
246
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Corporation, “a larger South African holding company/venture-capital
firm.”257 Strategic Resources Corporation owned approximately twenty other
subsidiary corporations, which assisted EO’s operations.258 “These firms are
essentially stay-behind asset protection companies;” while separate entities for
legal purposes, in many ways, the firms operated as parts of a conjunctive
whole.259 This corporate umbrella provided a complex network of corporate
interactions; indeed, as one commentator has noted, “EO forms part of a
tangled, constantly shifting web of corporate interests organized under the
Strategic Resources Group . . . includ[ing] mining, oil, infrastructure, air
transport, hospital construction, demining, water purification, computer
software, and other businesses, [that] feed off each other in symbiotic
fashion.”260 The close interaction and symbiotic relationships between various
subsidiaries became transparent when another Strategic Resources holding,
Branch Heritage Group, a mining and oil company with worldwide interests,
won many lucrative investments “in almost all the areas where Executive
Outcomes has conducted major operations.”261
EO recruited employees primarily from the South African Defence
Force.262 This cemented several tactical advantages, including common
military training, pre-existing hierarchy amongst military ranks, and “extensive
combat experience in low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency
operations.”263 In fact, the company boasted that its employees collectively
maintained over five thousand years of combat experience, providing a
tremendous competitive advantage.264
EO served as a total force provider in Sierra Leone in 1991. Sierra Leone
was rife with civil war between a corrupt, weak, and decentralized government
with virtually no cohesive standing military and a rogue, armed, and violent
civilian group known as the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”).265 The RUF
gained power as a result of the pervasive corruption in the national
government.266 However, the RUF quickly deteriorated into a brutally ruthless
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Id. at 104.
Id.
Id.
Zarate, supra note 73, at 100.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 104.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
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and violent organization which lacked “any clearly defined political
agenda.”267 Nevertheless, the RUF’s willingness to resort to violence against
the regime was appealing to the dispossessed and alienated population of the
post-colonial state.268 “The RUF also built out its force by abducting children
and forcing them to kill on its behalf.”269
Because the national government lacked an effective military,270 the RUF
was expected to overrun the government and take over control with little
military opposition and without external intervention.271 As a result, Sierra
Leone employed EO to provide a stand-alone, private military force which
conducted full-scale operations.272 EO “deployed a battalion-sized unit on the
ground, supplemented by artillery, transport and combat helicopters, fixed
wing combat and transport aircraft, a transport ship, and all types of ancillary
specialists.”273 Within nine days of arriving in Sierra Leone, EO had succeeded
in categorically repelling the RUF advance.274 Prior to EO’s engagement, the
RUF maneuvered road-side ambushes and quick withdrawals. EO, however,
materially changed the tactical strategy by constantly pursuing and punishing
the RUF at any point of contact.275 EO “also made use of air and artillery
assets and sought to engage the RUF in stand-up battles that the rebels were
loathe to face. The firm ultimately pushed the RUF back to the border regions.
Effectively defeated, the RUF agreed to negotiate with the government for the
first time.”276 After the RUF leader signed peace accords with the official
Sierra Leone government, he “‘conceded that had EO not intervened, he would
have taken Freetown and won the war.’”277 Therefore, by employing a full267

Id.
Id.
269 Id. The RUF was depicted in the 2005 movie, Blood Diamond. Blood Diamond,
CARNEGIECOUNCIL.ORG, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/education/002/film/reviews/0002.html/.
270 SINGER, supra note 1, at 111. Ironically, Siaka Stevens, the leader of post-colonial Sierra Leone, was
responsible for intentionally weakening the military to prevent a military takeover of his government and thus
solidify his power. Id. at 110. Unfortunately, it led to a power vacuum with the military untrained and unable
to effectively quash violent rebel aggression. Id. at 111.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 112.
273 Id. at 93–94 (parentheses omitted).
274 Id. at 112–13.
275 Id. at 113.
276 Id.
277 SINGER, supra note 1, at 114. Unfortunately, EO left Sierra Leone prematurely when the government
terminated its contract early. Id. EO had predicted that their premature departure would lead to another coup
within one hundred days. Id. Their prediction was surprisingly accurate—on the ninety-fifth day after EO’s
departure, another bloody RUF coup was successfully executed. Id. The coup ultimately led Sierra Leone to
contract with another PCMF, Sandline International. Id. at 115. Sandline was ultimately successful in quashing
268
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scale private military force, Sierra Leone was able to thwart the nearly
successful takeover of the government.
The government of Angola also employed EO to serve as a force multiplier
in conditions similar to Sierra Leone.278 In 1975, Angola became an
independent state and its former colonial ruler, Portugal, abruptly evacuated.279
Additionally, several hundred thousand Portuguese, who constituted virtually
the entire educated population of Angola, followed, robbing the country of all
valuable property—“including, in many cases, even taking their doorknobs.”280
The result was a new Angolan state with few resources and no specialized
military; a power vacuum and warring guerilla armies exacerbated the
situation.281 With no international military aid, Angola contracted with EO “to
help train the state army and direct front-line operations. It was at this same
time that most observers felt the government was teetering on the edge of
defeat.”282 EO provided Angola with tactical advice and served alongside
Angola’s government forces, using EO’s military experience to exploit the
opposition’s weaknesses and ultimately destroy morale by tactically
overwhelming opposition forces.283 Again, EO’s engagement prevented a
government takeover.
EO also provided services to Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia,
Congo, and several other states.284 In both Angola and Sierra Leone, “EO’s
superior technology, skill, and collective experience proved crucial in forcing
the RUF rebellion, using the same tactics that EO had employed previously. Id. However, Sandline’s
intervention was not without its own issues—Sandline had reportedly violated the UN arms embargo with the
knowledge and aid of Great Britain. Id.
278 Id. at 107–08.
279 Id. at 107.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 109.
283 Id. Specifically, a rebel group known as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(“UNITA”) advanced and eventually took over Angola’s oil facilities and refused to relinquish control over to
the government. Id. at 108–10. The oil resources and the revenues generated thereby were an “essential
government source of finance,” without which, it would inevitably collapse. Id. at 108. EO’s presence was so
significant, one UNITA soldier stated:
We used to know we could sleep well at night. In this recent war, new tactics meant that fighting
continued at night and that light infantry units led by these Executive Outcomes guys would
come deep behind our lines. We could no longer rest. It weakened us very much. It is the new
tactics in which they trained the FAA [the Angolan government army] that made the difference.
They introduced a new style of warfare to Angola. We were not used to this.
Id. at 110.
284 Id. at 115.
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the rebel movements in each country to negotiate respective settlements and in
restoring social order.”285 By tipping the tactical playing field in their clients’
favor, EO provided a valuable service in the PCMF market.
B. Military Security and Defense Firms
Military Security and Defense Firms (“MSDFs”)286 are the subject of the
most criticism for lack of direct governmental oversight and accountability.287
The MSDF is perhaps the most closely intertwined with the military, and in
practical application, is difficult to conceptually distinguish therefrom.288 The
hallmark of the MSDF is the potential to engage in combat-like activities,
contrasting with other types of firms.289 MSDFs are defensive in nature; they
provide security detail to high-level diplomats, supply convoys, and guard
headquarters.290 Because MSDFs perform their contractual duties in highly
unstable conflict-ridden areas, they are heavily armed and expected to carry
out their defensive security missions, using lethal means if necessary.291 As a
result, MSDFs are required to respond to potential threats in a manner that
most closely resembles the military. Indeed, because of the state’s traditional
monopoly on the use of force, MSDFs typically hire ex-military professionals
to provide security in conflict and post-conflict zones.292 MSDFs often possess
equipment and weaponry that rival or surpass the technology of small state
militaries.293 Contemporary scholarship has strongly advocated extending the
definition of mercenary to include exactly the type of firm services MSDFs
offer.294
Blackwater, recently renamed as Xe, served as an MSDF. Blackwater is a
private corporation which formally began operations in May 1998 in
285

Zarate, supra note 73, at 94.
Current scholarship has termed this type of PCMF “private military security companies.” See, e.g.,
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and International
Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 525, 526 (2006).
287 See, e.g., SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 35–36.
288 See, e.g., id. at 89 (calling Blackwater “the fifth branch of the U.S. military”).
289 See generally id. at 3–48 (describing Blackwater’s violence on “Baghdad’s Bloody Sunday”).
Blackwater provides a prototype for classifying a PMF as an MSDF because: (1) it is highly combative in
nature; (2) its defensive nature is evident from its contract to keep U.S. officials protected in Iraq; (3) it
maintains and trains an extensive, heavily armed private army; and (4) it employs ex-military professionals.
See id. at 10, 16, 132–33, 442–46.
290 See, e.g., id. at 16.
291 See id. at 3–48.
292 See SINGER, supra note 1, at 76.
293 See, e.g., SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 442–46 (describing Blackwater as a prototypical MSDF).
294 See infra Part V.
286
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North Carolina.295 Formed as the brainchild of retired Navy SEAL Al Clark
with the financial backing of billionaire Eric Prince, also a former SEAL,
Blackwater was created to provide a private sector solution for the “inadequate
training infrastructure” of the Navy.296 Because both Clark and Prince were
well connected with members of the Navy SEALs, the SEALs began using the
Blackwater facility to discreetly train their forces.297 After the success of
Blackwater’s contract with the SEALs, Blackwater generated more business
with state, federal, and even international agencies.298 In February of 2000,
Blackwater won a General Services Administration (“GSA”) contract, which
facilitated the U.S. government purchasing products or services from
Blackwater without having to evaluate and accept bids on the competitive
market.299 As a result, Blackwater’s business dealings with the U.S.
government began to increase at an exponential rate.300 The initial GSA
contract was estimated at a value of $125,000; when the contract was renewed
in 2005, the projected value was $6 million.301 This estimate greatly
undervalued the amount Blackwater was actually paid for services rendered;
by 2008, Blackwater sales reached more than $1 billion.302 Blackwater’s
growth since 2001 is a staggering 80,453%.303
In June of 2004, the State Department awarded Blackwater “one of the
most valuable and prestigious U.S. government contracts on the market”
through the Worldwide Personal Protective Service Program.304 The contract
described Blackwater’s services as diplomatic security and providing “Counter
Assault Teams and Long Range Marksman teams.”305 In this context,
Blackwater operated as security detail for a variety of U.S. and high-level
foreign officials wherever the need arose.306 Employees are typically hired
from various military installations worldwide because Blackwater’s services

295

SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 97.
Id. at 89–90.
297 Id. at 97–98.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 101–02. The GSA spokesman described the contract as a “multiple-award schedule [of]
indefinite quantity [and] indefinite delivery.” Id. at 102.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 103.
303 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 76.
304 SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 229.
305 Id.
306 See id.
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most closely resemble traditional military operations.307 Many have alleged
that Blackwater recruits from state militaries known for their reckless disregard
of human rights.308
Blackwater is one of the most notorious, and perhaps controversial, MSDFs
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.309 It has access to the most sophisticated
military equipment, including but not limited to: firearms, ammunition,
grenades, helicopters, armored vehicles, and even fighter jets, further blurring
the line between state-sanctioned military and a private mercenary firm.310
Perhaps the sole distinguishing element between a state military and the MSDF
is that the scope of the MSDF’s duties are limited to purely defensive
functions.311 Therefore, MSDFs only use weapons in a defensive measure for
fear of being labeled unlawful combatants if they use weapons in an offensive
measure.312
On April 4, 2004, in conjunction with Blackwater’s contract to protect CPA
headquarters in Najaf, Blackwater employees engaged in an all-out battle with
civilians during what began as a mere civilian protest.313 While eyewitness
accounts differ on how the battle began and who shot first, “once the shooting
began, Blackwater’s men . . . were unloading clip after clip, firing thousands of
rounds and hundreds of 40 mm grenades into the crowd. They fired so many
rounds that some of them had to stop shooting every fifteen minutes to let their
gun barrels cool.”314 In fact, Blackwater used so much ammunition that three
company helicopters flew in during the engagement to deliver more
supplies.315 One Blackwater employee began to make a video record of the
conflict,316 which is indecipherable from a military engagement. U.S. Marine
307 See id. at 245–73 (discussing Blackwater’s recruiting operations in Chile, Columbia, Romania, and
Honduras). A noteworthy distinction between Blackwater and both EO and Military Professional Resources
Incorporation is that while the latter two firms also focused greatly on hiring ex-military, they hired almost
solely from the hiring state’s ex-military, which aided in uniform standards and training. See SINGER, supra
note 1, at 103, 120. Blackwater does not maintain the same uniformity, hiring around the globe. SCAHILL,
supra note 2, at 245.
308 See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 245.
309 See ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 79.
310 See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 54–55.
311 See Tom Gardner, Defense Contractors vs. Private Military Contractors, SEARCHWARP (Oct. 8,
2008), http://searchwarp.com/swa382054.htm.
312 Id.
313 SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 181–96 (describing the events of that day).
314 Id. at 188. (footnotes omitted).
315 Id. at 190. (footnotes omitted).
316 Id. at 188. The Najaf battle was recorded by Blackwater contractors and is publicly available for
viewing on YouTube. U.S. Soldiers Repel Attack in Blackwater Najaf (Part 1), YOUTUBE, http://www.
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Cpl. Lonnie Young, who had arrived to install communication equipment, was
present during the conflict and was taking tactical orders from Blackwater
employees during the “defensive” mission, blurring the chain-of-command.317
Cpl. Young stated, “I gazed over the streets with straining eyes, only to see
hundreds of dead Iraqis lying all over the ground.”318 After the Najaf incident,
senior Blackwater executive Patrick Toohey acknowledged, “This is a whole
new issue in military affairs. Think about it. You’re actually contracting
civilians to do military-like duties.”319 Due to the MSDFs’ close resemblance
to traditional military operations, MSDFs require their own distinct categorical
framework.
C. Military Intelligence Firms
Military Intelligence Firms (“MIFs”)320 provide services such as procuring,
interpreting, and analyzing intelligence in all forms. Traditionally, states
performed all intelligence-based procurement and analysis due to the risk of
revealing highly sensitive information.321 Nonetheless, the current trend shows
a greater reliance on intelligence acquired and analyzed by private firms.322
Firms can provide a broad array of services, in both conflict and non-conflict
zones, ranging from providing complete aerial surveillance to simply analyzing
and processing intelligence data, which may be little more than providing a
translation service.323 There are three basic types of services MIFs offer—
interrogation, surveillance, and intelligence analysis.324 In order to qualify as

youtube.com/watch?v=3Y2Z8aJDq0s (last visited Feb. 13, 2011); U.S. Soldiers Repel Attack in Blackwater,
Najaf (Part 2), YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNXm-dld-30 (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
317 SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 186–87.
318 Id. at 190 (quoting Cpl. Young). Cpl. Young was present at the Najaf battle. Id. at 186–87.
319 Id. at 193–94.
320 This category has not been distinguished from other PCMFs by contemporary scholarship, as the
procurement of intelligence has previously been considered the primary domain of states. See Walter Pincus,
Increase in Contracting Intelligence Jobs Raising Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2006, at A3. Additionally,
the sensitive nature of obtaining intelligence from individuals increases the potential to commit violations of
human rights. See War Profiteer of the Month: CACI, 23 WAR PROFITEERS’ NEWS (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://www.wri-irg.org/node/9927 (discussing the accountability of interrogators working for CACI as regards
torturing detainees). For the purpose of this Article, there will be a separate category for these PCMFs.
321 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 117. Indeed, “[a]n Army policy directive published in 2000, and still in
effect today, classifies any job that involves ‘the gathering and analysis’ of tactical intelligence as ‘an
inherently governmental function barred from private sector performance.’” Id. (footnote omitted).
322 Pincus, supra note 320.
323 See, e.g., About L-3, L-3 COMM., http://www.l-3com.com/about-l3/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
324 See, e.g., War Profiteer of the Month: CACI, supra note 320 (discussing CACI’s history and current
services).
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an MIF, only one of the aforementioned services must be offered,325 although
many firms offer comprehensive intelligence packages.326
CACI is an example of an MIF. It is a publicly traded corporation that was
formed in 1962 by Herb Karr, an entrepreneurial financier, and Harry
Markowitz,327 an economist who developed the first computer simulation
programming language named SIMSCRIPT.328 SIMSCRIPT “was designed to
allow analysts to build computer representations of complex activities such as
air traffic and war games.”329 The company initially offered services in the
field of simulation programming and provided training and support to users.330
During the 1970s, CACI opened offices in Europe and began to offer
information services both domestically and worldwide.331 In the mid-1990s,
CACI, like most PCMFs, took advantage of the post-Cold War downsizing and
offered information technology to the federal government, and thus became
one of the twenty-five largest federal primary contractors.332 It sold simulation
products to the Pentagon and document-handling systems to the Justice
Department.333 By 1998, CACI began acquiring several small intelligencerelated firms, thus becoming a premier provider of information technology
services.334 “In 2006, CACI was one of seven contractors chosen by the U.S.
Army to provide technology and engineering services worth as much as $19
billion over a ten-year period.”335
CACI was heavily scrutinized after its involvement in the Abu Ghraib
prison scandals in Iraq.336 The U.S. government hired CACI to provide
interrogation services and procure evidence for the counterinsurgency mission
from Iraqi detainees.337 As U.S. military commanders “sought operational
intelligence, it became apparent that the intelligence structure was

325

ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 14.
See, e.g., About L-3, supra note 323.
327 CACI History, CACI, http://www.caci.com/about/hist.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
328 Profile of Harry Markowitz, QFINANCE: THE ULTIMATE FIN. RESOURCE, http://www.
qfinance.com/asset-management-thinkers/harry-markowitz (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
329 War Profiteer of the Month: CACI, supra note 320.
330 CACI History, CACI, http://www.caci.com/about/hist.shtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
331 War Profiteer of the Month: CACI, supra note 320.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 See id.
335 Id.
336 Peter Beaumont, Abu Ghraib Abuse Firms Are Rewarded, OBSERVER (London), Jan. 16, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jan/16/usa.iraq.
337 Id. The U.S. contractor Titan was also involved in the Abu Ghraib torture allegations. Id.
326
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undermanned, under-equipped, and inappropriately organized for counterinsurgency operations.”338 MIFs filled the gaps where the military simply did
not have the manpower or the infrastructure readily available to effectively
perform this function. According to the U.S. Army’s report after the Abu
Ghraib incident, military personnel acted as subordinates, obeying orders from
CACI interrogators.339 CACI employees participated in several human rights
violations, including, but not limited to, using military dogs to threaten
prisoners, repeatedly physically abusing detainees, and using sleep deprivation
tactics.340 The Abu Ghraib scandal highlighted concerns of PCMFs lacking a
clear chain of command and accountability.341
At the time the Abu Ghraib scandal occurred, no extraterritorial
jurisdictional statute existed with which the United States could prosecute the
contractors or the company.342 As a result, Congress amended the MEJA to
include contractors “working in support of the military’s mission abroad” to
eliminate the jurisdictional gap for contractors in the future.343 Iraqi nationals
and their next-of-kin filed a civil suit against CACI for torture under the Alien
Tort Statute.344 In Saleh v. Titan Corp., the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were preempted by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., which provided
immunity to a civilian helicopter manufacturer from a manufacturing defect
suit when the helicopter was manufactured for the Department of Defense.345
The Court in Boyle held that even absent specific legislation providing
immunity to an independent contractor for design defect, the issue was of

338 LTG Anthony R. Jones, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON AND 205TH MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 11, available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2004/abuse/fay-jones_report.pdf.
339 Id. at 51.
340 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 119–20 (discussing a classic case of outsourcing going awry, involving
CACI employee Steven Stephanowicz “who was trained . . . to inspect satellite pictures, not to be an
interrogator. Yet he reportedly directed the abuse in one of the most infamous incidents captured on camera at
Abu Ghraib: a prisoner in an orange jumpsuit being menaced with an unmuzzled dog. He was never charged
with a crime.”) Id. at 120.
341 Id. When Brigadier General Jani Karipinski, who was in charge of the 80th Military Police Brigade
running Abu Ghraib, was interviewed regarding the military control over Titan translators, she was asked,
“How does the chain of command work?” Id. She replied, “We had no control over them at all.” Id. at 126.
342 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The United States could have prosecuted CACI
under torture statutes, but, probably because the burden of proof was too high, failed to do so. The government
also did not pursue any civil contract claims against CACI. Id.
343 Glenn Schmitt, Hold Contractors Accountable, ARMY TIMES, http://www.armytimes.com/community/
opinion/army_backtalk_contractors_071126/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
344 See generally Saleh, 580 F.3d 1.
345 Id. at 5.
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“uniquely federal concern” and thus the corporation was immune from suit.346
The court in Saleh extended this reasoning to the Abu Ghraib scandal, stating,
“We think that the following formulation better secures the federal interests
concerned: During wartime, where a private service contractor is integrated
into combatant activities over which the military retains command authority, a
tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in such activities shall be
preempted.”347 As a result, the plaintiffs were prevented from pursuing any
civil claims arising out of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.348
D. Military Consultant Firms
Military Consultant Firms (“MCFs”) provide advisory and tactical
expertise training to militaries exclusively off of the battlefield.349 While MCFs
can reshape the strategic environment by restructuring and providing tactical
military advantages, they do not directly participate in any combat operations
alongside the client.350 Despite MCFs’ noted absence from the battlefield, the
value in their application of knowledge and training is substantial.351 In
modern warfare, the “brain trust” and expertise that MCFs provide potentially
alters the landscape of the entire conflict.352 MCFs include firms that provide
pure technical analysis, as well as firms that offer consultation and physical
training related to the analytical recommendations.353 The distinguishing factor
of MCFs from other PCMFs is that while MCFs provide consultation and
training directly related to military combat, they are not present in the physical
implementation on the battlefield.354
Military Professional Resources Incorporation (“MPRI”), an MCF, was
founded and registered in Delaware in 1978 by eight former senior military
officers.355 The firm primarily recruits retired U.S. military personnel of
various levels, maintaining a meticulously managed database that collectively
346

Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 550 (1988).
Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9.
348 It is unclear whether the Boyle doctrine will be extended by other courts to encompass PCMFs. See
Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding the district court’s ruling that Boyle did not
provide immunity to federal contractor Halliburton for conduct which occurred in Iraq was not immediately
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine).
349 SINGER, supra note 1, at 95.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 96.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 Id. at 119–20.
347
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replicates “every single military skill.”356 The firm has deep-rooted ties with
the U.S. military; approximately ninety-five percent of its employee pool
formerly served in the U.S. Army, and the twenty-three original founding
members of MPRI collectively maintained over seven hundred years of
military experience.357 With uniform military training backgrounds, MPRI
maintains tactical cohesion, which provides it with a tremendous advantage
over other PCMF competitors.358 Another noteworthy characteristic of MPRI
is the close ties it has formed with high levels of the U.S. government.359 This
has led some commentators to question “whether MPRI is simply a private
extension of the U.S. military.”360
MPRI became invaluable in the mid-1990s for its strategic expertise in
warfare in the former conflict-ridden Yugoslavia.361 When Croatia asserted
independence from the former Yugoslavia, it had not developed a military that
could effectively quash internal rebellion.362 As a result, the Croatian army was
ill equipped to respond to the minority Serbian rebellion, which was backed by
the Yugoslav army.363 In 1995, MPRI entered into two contracts with the
Croatian government: the first was to provide “strategic long-term capabilities”
to the Croatian Ministry of Defense, and the second was for MPRI to design a
Democracy Transition Assistance Program, which purportedly “provide[d] for
the classroom instruction in democratic principles and civil-military relations
to officers previously accustomed to the Soviet model of organization.”364
Neither contract officially provided for any direct tactical military training.365
By August of 1995, the effect of MPRI on the Croatian military was so
pervasive that it took the entire international community by surprise.366 In a
massive offensive against rebel Serbs, “the Croat army revealed that it had
transformed from a ragtag militia into a highly professional fighting force.”367
While MPRI did not provide any tangible aid on the battlefield itself, the
training and expertise the firm provided completely transformed the Croatian
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367

Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id.
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army in a material manner.368 Although MPRI publicly maintained that it had
not provided any official tactical military assistance or training in the offensive
against the Serbs, it is a commonly accepted belief that MPRI trained the
Croatian army “in basic infantry tactics (such as covering fields of fire and
flanking maneuvers), and medium-unit strategy and coordination as well.”369
Indeed, after MPRI began training the army, there was a “dramatic
organizational and attitudinal transformation,” which resembled a Westernstyle engagement, in contrast to outdated Soviet military strategies.370 The
issue of both training and weapon support and supply was of great significance
because there was a contemporaneous 1991 UN Arms Embargo that
categorically prohibited the sale of arms, military and tactical training, and
advice.371 The United States, as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, had voted to approve this embargo.372 Thus, MPRI, performing as a
PCMF, with close ties to the U.S. government, was able to provide services
covertly to the Balkan region, in violation of the embargo. By many accounts,
MPRI furthered U.S. interests in the region, without absorbing the same
political and international condemnation that a state providing identical
services would receive.373 Many international observers believed that the
United States tacitly approved, and even facilitated, MPRI’s covert tactics.374
Due in large part to the success of training the Croatian army, MPRI won a
large contract with Bosnia that expressly included “official provisions for
combat training.”375 The structure of the contract was somewhat of an
anomaly—the Bosnian government received all of the military training
benefits from the contract, while Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, Brunei, and

368
369
370
371
372
373
374

Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id.
Id. This belief is troublesome as
numerous reports of human violations surfaced in the wake of the offensive, including the
murder of elderly Serbs who had stayed behind. The International War Crimes Tribunal
has since indicted the Croat commanders of the offensive, who may or may not have
received instruction and guidance from MPRI or Pentagon planners.

Id. at 126.
375 Id. at 128.
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the United Arab Emirates funded the payment of the contract.376 Furthermore,
an official at the U.S. State Department “administered both the program and
the financial account into which the money was deposited.”377 Critics of the
contract pointed to the undue amount of “unofficial” government involvement
and the fear that military training may have led to the creation of a Bosnian
military that was much more powerful than its neighbors—and thus motivated
to use offensive strategies to recapture lands previously lost.378 Currently, in
Iraq, several MCFs are training Iraqi police forces and the military in various
capacities.379 This type of PCMF provides a valuable resource in the postwar
reconstruction of both Iraq and Afghanistan.
E. Military Logistics Firms
Military Logistics Firms (“MLFs”) provide logistics support unrelated to
direct combat operations, such as transportation, road repair, mail delivery,
cargo handling and railhead operation, and refueling.380 While MLFs provide
ancillary support to either combat or nation-building, they often enter
dangerous and unfriendly territory exposing them to lethal force in pursuance
of their contractual obligations.381 Particularly in the realm of transportation,
MLFs have been confronted with a tremendous amount of violence on supply
routes, resulting in a mounting death count of contractors serving MLFs in
Iraq.382
Halliburton-KBR is an MLF operating in Iraq. In 1919, the Brown
brothers, including brother-in-law and financier Dan Root, formed Kellog,
Brown & Root (“KBR”) in Texas.383 The company developed expertise in
construction and engineering and became financially successful by assuming

376

Id. This setup reveals a very important issue with regard to PCMFs that the law has not fully
addressed—the extent to which states can fund private militaries to perform tactical or combat operations that
serve the funding states’ interests.
377 Id.
378 Id. at 129–30.
379 See, e.g., ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 67, 91–95. DynCorp, for instance, was hired to train Iraqi police
enforcement. Id. at 91–95.
380 SINGER, supra note 1, at 144.
381 See, e.g., Aaron Walter, Fisher v. KBR–Fifth Circuit to Consider Jurisdiction Over Contractors in
Iraq, DEF. BASE ACT BLOG (Mar. 7, 2008), http://defensebaseactblog.com/2008/03/07/fisher-v-kbr-fifthcircuit-to-consider-jurisdiction-over-contractors-in-iraq.
382 Id.; see IRAQ FOR SALE, supra note 157 (claiming Halliburton knowingly placed civilian contractors in
the Red Zone without proper security or defense forces and with no weapons for self defense).
383 SINGER, supra note 1, at 137.
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risky projects with the potential for large payouts.384 In 1963, Halliburton, a
global construction and energy services company, purchased KBR as a
subsidiary corporation.385 Halliburton officially separated from KBR forty-four
years later, in April of 2007.386 The Halliburton-KBR team has maintained
long-standing ties with the government, dating back to KBR’s somewhat
dubious relationship with former President Lyndon B. Johnson,387 through the
Bush administration, as former Vice President Dick Cheney served as
Halliburton’s CEO from 1995 to 2000.388 During Cheney’s tenure at the firm,
Halliburton-KBR received $1.5 billion in government contracts, in contrast
with the $100 million government credit guarantees the company received
prior to Cheney joining the firm.389
KBR’s first military government contract, worth $3.9 million, dates back to
1992, when the Department of Defense commissioned KBR “to produce a
classified report detailing how private companies . . . could help provide
logistics for US troops deployed into potential war zones around the world.”390
The report paved the way for KBR to win the governmental contract to provide
logistics and support for the U.S. military in the ongoing humanitarian crisis in
Somalia.391 The firm’s logistics and support effectively streamlined nonessential military functions, such as site maintenance and operations.392 The
contract’s success led to the government awarding KBR more contracts for
services in Rwanda, Haiti, and Kuwait.393 With each subsequent contract, the
scope of KBR’s logistics and support services increased.394 In 1995, KBR won
a $546 million contract to provide support to U.S. troops and NATO

384

Id.
Id.
386 Halliburton, KBR Split Up, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSN0523848520070405.
387 Interestingly, in 1966, Donald Rumsfeld, then congressman of Illinois, condemned contracts between
KBR and the government during the Vietnam War, stating, “Why this huge contract has not been and is not
now being adequately audited is beyond me. The potential for waste and profiteering under such a contract is
substantial.” Pratap Chatterjee, Halliburton’s Army: The Way America Makes War, Speech at Powell’s City of
Books (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=8853192868942769225&hl#;
see also RITA J. KING, BIG, EASY MONEY: DISASTER PROFITEERING ON THE AMERICAN GULF COAST 6 (Brooke
Shelby Biggs ed., 2006).
388 See SINGER, supra note 237, at 137.
389 Id. at 140.
390 Id. at 142.
391 Id. at 143.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
385
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peacekeeping forces in the Balkans.395 KBR provided services ranging from
engineering and construction, to food and laundry services, to transportation
and vehicle maintenance.396 In sum, KBR provided all of the contingency
services required to operate a base without any of the offensive and defensive
combat-related military functions.
KBR is one of the largest contractors providing logistics and support in
Iraq.397 Between 2003 and the summer of 2007, KBR had solidified over $20
billion in logistics and support contracts.398 To put this number into
perspective, the amount paid to KBR alone is roughly three times what the
U.S. government paid to fight the entire 1991 Persian Gulf War.399 On March
2, 2010, the government awarded another comprehensive logistics contract to
KBR.400 In performance of the contract, KBR will provide air terminal
operations, bulk fuel operations, bulk fuel transportation, maintenance and
heavy equipment transportation, movement control functions, recovery
operations, and comprehensive postal services, to name a few.401 Because KBR
operates under a cost-plus contract, many commentators have argued (and
company whistleblowers have confirmed) that KBR intentionally engaged in
wasteful spending and overcharged the U.S. government for services and
materials provided.402
Much of the transportation KBR is contracted to perform will place it
directly into hostile conflict zones where contractors may potentially face
lethal force. In fact, many KBR contractors have been killed by insurgents as a
direct result of transporting goods in conflict zones in Iraq.403 The environment

395

Id.
See id.
397 Jackie Spinner, For One Contractor, A Road Too Hard, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2005, at A01.
398 SINGER, supra note 1, at 247.
399 Id.
400 KBR Awarded Major Task Order Under Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) IV
Contract, KBR (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.kbr.com/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2010/03/02/KBR-AwardedMajor-Task-Order-Under-Logistics-Civil-Augmentation-Program-LOGCAP-IV-Contract.
401 Id.
402 See, e.g., Pratap Chatterjee, New Halliburton Whistleblowers Say Millions Wasted in Iraq,
CORPWATCH (June 16, 2004), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11373.
403 See, e.g., John Burnett, The Trucker’s War: On the Road to Iraq, NPR (May 25, 2006), http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5431088. Many lawsuits have arisen out of these deaths. For
instance, in Martin v. Halliburton, the plaintiffs sued Halliburton for negligence in maintaining safe conditions
for truckers, which led to the death of one such trucker. Martin v. Halliburton, 601 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir.
2010), superseded by 618 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010). The court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 393.
396
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has proven to be so dangerous that KBR convoys have used private armed
security for protection.404
F. Military Support Firms
Military Support Firms (“MSFs”) perform non-lethal secondary tasks that
are not a primary component of the core offensive or defensive military
mission, but are nonetheless necessary to the maintenance of such
operations.405 MSFs are, by far, the largest of the five categories of PCMFs, in
terms of both scope and revenue, performing tasks such as engineering,
construction, food services, laundry operations, maintenance of military bases,
and power generation to name a few.406 MSFs provide services exclusively on
base and thus are not involved in any strategic tactical or combat warfare.
While historically all such support was conducted by the military, outsourcing
support allows the military to expend manpower only in essential combatrelated missions. The U.S. government awarded a contract unprecedented in
size to KBR at the onset of the war in Iraq, arguing both military and market
efficiencies.407 Paul Cerjan, Vice President of KBR Worldwide Military
Affairs, claimed that outsourcing logistics and support activities was
significantly more economically advantageous to the government.408 Cerjan
revealed that in the summer of 2005, KBR had the equivalent of thirty
battalions worth of support.409 A battalion contains between 300 and 1000
troops, which would yield between 9000 contractors on the low end and
30,000 on the high end.410 This number is most certainly significantly greater
today; unfortunately, the exact number of contractors employed as MSFs has
not been disclosed by the U.S. government.411
404 The U.S. government filed a lawsuit because KBR used private armed security forces and then billed
the government in direct violation of KBR’s contractual terms. Delvin Barnett, US Sues KBR: Iraq Charges
from Contractor Were Improper, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2010, 7:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/04/02/us-sues-kbr-iraq-charges-_n_522707.html.
405 SINGER, supra, note 1, at 97.
406 Ebrahim, supra note 64, at 185; see SINGER, supra note 1, at 144.
407 See Michael Dobbs, Halliburton’s Deals Greater than Thought, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2003, at A01.
408 Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 42. This contention is highly debatable. Most recently, there
have been allegations that KBR knowingly allowed contaminated food and water to be served and used by the
U.S. military, causing many to become ill. See Kelly Kennedy, Suit Claims Halliburton, KBR Sickened Base,
ARMY TIMES (Dec. 3, 2008, 7:00 PM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/12/military_kbr_lawsuit_
121508w/.
409 Frontline: Private Warriors, supra note 42.
410 United States Army: Chain of Command (Organization), ABOUT.COM, http://usmilitary.about.com/od/
army/l/blchancommand.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
411 SINGER, supra note 1, at 245.
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This Article distinguishes between logistics firms and support firms, but the
majority of scholarship has categorized them together.412 The two are
distinguishable, as support activities occur almost exclusively on the military
base, where there is very little potential for any combat or insurgent-related
violence.413 This characteristic distinguishes a logistics firm from a support
firm since, by definition, transportation requires MLFs to leave military bases
and travel through perilous areas that often lead to violent encounters. The
environment in which MLFs operate is distinct from that of MSFs, resulting in
significantly different expectations. As previously mentioned, a PCMF can
provide services that place the firm in multiple categories.414 Nonetheless,
when delineating categories to devolve legal status, it is helpful to distinguish
MLFs from MSFs, as the services and environment in which these firms
operate are distinct. KBR is the largest support firm in Iraq, and its corporate
structure and operations are discussed infra Part IV.E.
V. A SURVEY OF MODERN THEORIES OF PCMF REGULATION
This Part briefly surveys various theories proposed by experts and
commentators to regulate and prosecute PCMFs. All of these theories present
viable steps in reforming the current system, but to date, no theory
comprehensively addresses the legal accountability gap. Nonetheless, it is
essential to discuss the theories that are currently in the market to determine
what type of framework should be employed.
A. Extension of the Term Mercenary
The current approach to defining and regulating mercenaries has focused
on an archaic and outdated form of mercenarism.415 As such, “mercenary,” as
currently defined, does not adequately encompass the current structure and
characteristics of the modern PCMF.416 Some have suggested revisiting the
definition of mercenary and expanding it to include PCMFs; alternatively,
others have proffered a flexible interpretive approach, thereby extending the
mercenary definition to PCMFs, taking into account that both PCMFs and
412

See, e.g., id. at 97–98.
See id. at 91–93. This is not to say that contractors serving on the base are completely protected from
violence; it is just not as likely. See, e.g., Michael Howard, Insurgents Operate at Will in Mosul, US Says,
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 24, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/dec/24/iraq.michaelhoward.
414 See supra text accompanying notes 158–72.
415 Milliard, supra note 74, at 76.
416 Id. at 4–5.
413
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mercenaries serve the same underlying purposes and are induced to participate
in conflict primarily for remuneration.417 These arguments are unpersuasive at
first glance, because in order for the basic definition of “mercenary” to be
relevant, the existence of an armed conflict is required. As previously
discussed, the definitions of armed conflict and the distinctions between
internal and international conflict are now obsolete in reference to the current
PCMF debate.418 Even if the “armed conflict” requirement were eliminated,
the fundamental problem in applying the existing definition of “mercenary,” or
even attempting to extend the definition to fit the PCMF dilemma would still
exist—the PCMF, as a hybrid quasi-corporate, quasi-military organization, was
not contemplated when the “mercenary” definition was formulated. As such,
regulating PCMFs using an outdated, seemingly irrelevant framework (or a
modification of the same) is intellectually dishonest and devoid of pragmatism.
The PCMF industry provides an array of services so vast, as discussed in Part
III, one single term would be incapable of accurately depicting and regulating
PCMFs while taking into account the many nuances within the industry.
Indeed, “even the U.N. Special Rapporteur for the Regulation of Mercenaries,
Emanual Ballesteros, spent five years trying to come up with a workable
definition of a ‘mercenary,’ and the result was unworkable and laughably
vague.”419
It is clear that because the current definition of “mercenary” is woefully
inadequate in addressing PCMFs, a new legal status must be conceived which
more aptly characterizes the modern day PCMF.420 It is this Article’s
contention that the most effective way to regulate PCMFs is to create a
framework that takes into consideration the various nuances that the industry
exhibits. Attempting to fit PCMFs into an existing analytical structure that was
created for persons so conceptually distinct from PCMFs will be ineffective in
regulating the industry in the long term. It is clear that governments are
increasingly outsourcing the whole gamut of military functions to PCMFs, and
therefore, it is far more pragmatic to regulate and define the industries using a

417 See, e.g., Zoe Salzman, Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputation, 40
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 853, 887–88 (2008); see also James Coleman, Constraining Modern Mercenarism,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1494 (2004).
418 See supra text accompanying notes 88–92.
419 CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 15. Not surprisingly, PCMF industry heads also maintain that the term
“mercenary” does not and should not apply to PCMFs. See Salzman, supra note 417, at 855. Their argument is
perhaps motivated more by the political and etymological underpinnings that the term “mercenary” conveys.
420 “Anyone [within the PCMF industry] who manages actually to get prosecuted under existing antimercenary laws actually deserves to ‘be shot and their lawyer beside them.’” SINGER, supra note 1, at 238.
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framework that reflects the reality as it exists now, rather than extending the
definition of “mercenary” to the current debate.421
B. Corporate Self-Regulation
Many industry leaders have argued that corporate self-regulation can
provide adequate accountability measures through the implementation of
rigorous codes of conduct to be used throughout the industry, which will
codify and embody human rights principles.422 One author defines codes of
conduct as “self-imposed corporate obligations for the adoption of normative,
and therefore not necessarily legally enforceable, standards which are not part
of the original core business objectives of the company.”423
A study performed to evaluate PCMF compliance standards in enforcing
the protection of human rights by implementing internal codes of conduct,
operating procedures, and other internal guidance mechanisms noted that six
major PCMFs developed regulatory frameworks in anticipation of government
regulation.424 While the codes of conduct appear to cover all company
employees, including senior management, suppliers, agents, and others, “these
frameworks rarely appear to cover subcontractors.”425 Ethics committees,
human resources departments, or legal officials typically supervise and
implement these regulations.426 It is noteworthy that PCMFs that took an active
role in implementing a code of conduct were “a minority in the industry.”427

421 It is also necessary to point out that international law disfavors mercenaries. As such, it is unlikely that
states that employ PCMFs will agree to an extension of the mercenary definition to encompass PCMFs.
Indeed, Protocol I denies mercenaries status as “combatants” and “prisoners of war,” potentially allowing for
criminal prosecutions of acts, which state militaries are privileged to perform during war. See Govern & Bales,
supra note 81, at 79–82.
422 See generally JAMES COCKAYNE ET AL., BEYOND MARKET FORCES: REGULATING THE GLOBAL
SECURITY INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/beyond_market_
forces_final.pdf.
423 NILS ROSEMANN, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES, OCCASIONAL
PAPER NO. 15, CODE OF CONDUCT: TOOL FOR SELF REGULATION FOR PRIVATE MILITARY & SECURITY
COMPANIES 5 (2008).
424 COCKAYNE ET AL., supra note 422, at 45.
425 Id. at 45–46. This is a huge problem, because much of the PCMF contract requires further
subcontracting. Id. at 46.
426 Id.
427 Id. at 45. Unfortunately, most corporations, as profit-seeking entities, seek means of cutting costs and
producing higher profits. Thus, codifications provide little more than lip service. Indeed, PCMFs have been
known to neglect the safety and human rights of their own employees. For instance, several well-known
PCMFs have circumvented safety protocols in dangerous areas to save money. ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 46.
In one such instance, four Blackwater employees were sent to deliver kitchen equipment through Fallujah, Al
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The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights provide another
international set of non-binding principles to delineate guidelines ensuring the
respect of human rights by PCMFs operating in conflict zones.428 Participants
include the entire range of stakeholders: state governments, NGOs,
organizations with observer status (such as the International Red Cross) and
private corporations.429 The effort is part of a larger movement to improve
global corporate responsibility.430 By definition, the principles are voluntary
and must be implemented by corporations individually within their own
corporate framework.431 As such, the Voluntary Principles fail to provide any
direct mechanism of accountability, but rather intend to assert aspirational
principles.432
Additionally, the PCMF non-profit trade group, International Peace
Operations Association433 (“IPOA”), which currently boasts membership of
fifty-five PCMFs,434 provides a code of conduct to “ensure the ethical
standards of [IPOA] member companies operating in conflict and post-conflict
environments so that they may contribute their valuable services for the benefit
of international peace and human security.”435 IPOA states that its mission is to
“promote high operational and ethical standards of firms active in the peace
and stability operations industry.”436 Despite the fact that the IPOA code
includes “sections on transparency, ethics, and accountability” and provides for
the dismissal of member companies if they fail to uphold the provisions of the
code, the code “is not a binding document with any legal weight

Anbar, Iraq, without adequate maps and the requisite number of people and trucks in a transport convoy. Id. at
54. As a result, insurgents killed the employees and publicly maimed and mutilated their bodies. Id.
428 Introduction, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY & HUM. RTS., http://www.voluntaryprinciples.
org/principles/introduction (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
429 Participants, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY & HUM. RTS., http://www.voluntaryprinciples.
org/participants/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
430 Introduction, supra note 428.
431 COCKAYNE ET AL., supra note 422, at 46.
432 Id.
433 Scahill describes the name of the organization as “Orwellian” in that it denotes peace, and yet it
actually profits from conflict. Jeremy Scahill, US “Security” Companies Offer “Services” in Haiti,
REBELREPORTS (Jan. 18, 2010), http://rebelreports.com/post/341031627/us-security-companies-offer-servicesin-haiti.
434 See ISOA Member Companies, INT’L STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE, http://ipoaworld.org/eng/
isoamembers.html (last visited Feb. 16. 2011). Blackwater once was a member company, but after the Nisour
Square shootings, Blackwater voluntarily withdrew its membership. SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 357.
435 ISOA Code of Conduct, 12–English, INT’L STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE, http://ipoaworld.org/
eng/codeofconduct/87-codecodeofconductv12enghtml.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
436 About ISOA, INT’L STABILITY OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE, http://ipoaworld.org/eng/aboutisoa.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011).
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whatsoever.”437 Furthermore, when Blackwater withdrew from IPOA
following the Nisour Square incident, IPOA’s ability to regulate its
membership proved impotent.438
The movement of the PCMF industry and other stakeholders to provide
self-regulation that reflects human rights norms is generally laudable and
certainly signifies a step in the right direction. However, it falls short of
providing comprehensive solutions to the PCMF accountability gap, primarily
because all conformity with international principles is purely voluntary. While
this emerging trend may prevent human rights violations in the future, it
provides no punitive solution to firms and contractors, should such a violation
occur.
C. Incorporating International Law Against Corporations
Recently, TNCs have utilized their power and influence to participate in
international lawmaking settings that are traditionally reserved for nationstates, such as treaty negotiations and international institutions like the
International Labor Organization.439 Such participation demonstrates their
positions as serious international actors that can effectively help formulate
international law.440 Furthermore, TNCs are increasingly developing binding
international law norms through customary international law.441 Lex
Mercatoria, or the law between private merchants, has been recognized as
enforceable by both domestic courts and international tribunals.442
Commentators argue that because international law affords TNCs rights and
privileges, it follows that TNCs should be equally responsible for ensuring
accountability—particularly in the realm of international human rights.443
In response to the rising influence of TNCs, many have called for the direct
international regulation of corporations. In 1998, the UN Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established a working group on
business and human rights.444 The working group, which consisted of twentysix independent experts, was commissioned to formulate regulations relating to
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444

SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 358.
ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 81.
Bederman, supra note 201, at 209.
Id.
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Ruggie, supra note 200, at 3.
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TNC activities to promote human rights.445 In 2003, the working group
produced the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
(“Draft Norms”).446 Despite the working group’s valiant effort, the
international community failed to adopt and implement the Draft Norms.447 In
fact, to the contrary, the business community heavily criticized the proposed
regulations.448
While the Draft Norms acknowledged that nation-states were the primary
actors of international law, it recognized the growing global impact of TNCs
and thus placed a heavy burden on corporations to ensure compliance with
human rights. Accordingly, the Draft Norms stated, “Within their respective
spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business
enterprises have an obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect,
ensure respect of and protect” both nationally and internationally recognized
human rights.449 The language essentially placed upon corporations a range of
duties identical to those of states, so long as they were “[w]ithin their
respective spheres of activity and influence.”450 The only distinction the Draft
Norms made between the state and the TNC is that the state’s duties were
primary, while the TNC’s duties were secondary.451
John Ruggie, who was later appointed as the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the United Nations on Business to facilitate the
development of human rights norms for TNCs, criticized the Draft Norms,
stating, “Indeed, because corporations are not democratic public interest
institutions they should be permitted to have such roles only in exceptional
circumstances—for example, where they perform state functions.”452 Carving
out a narrow exception, Ruggie stated:

445

Id.
Id.
447 See Brittany T. Cragg, Comment, Home Is Where the Halt Is: Mandating Corporate Social
Responsibility for Transnational Corporations Through Home State Regulation and Social Disclosure, 24
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 735, 746 (2010).
448 Ruggie, supra note 200, at 4.
449 United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
450 Ruggie, supra note 200, at 9.
451 Id. at 10.
452 Id. at 11.
446
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There are legitimate arguments in support of the proposition that it
may be desirable in some circumstances for corporations to become
direct bearers of international human rights obligations, especially
where host Governments cannot or will not enforce their obligations
and where the classical international human rights regime, therefore,
453
cannot possibly be expected to function as intended.

However, Ruggie provided no specific guidance as to what conditions
would trigger such liability, the human rights laws to which TNCs specifically
would be bound, and lastly, which forum would have jurisdiction to prosecute
these violations (assuming the state where the violations occurred did not have
the infrastructure or political will to do so).
It appears that theories advocating the direct regulation of corporations
seem to be in their infancy or marginalized in legal academia. While this
theory of regulation for PCMFs may be possible in the future, it appears that
there is no current structure that would provide such direct legal accountability
on corporations. As such, there is a need to develop a body that would
adequately delineate PCMF responsibility for violations of human rights and
delineate what state or international body would prosecute them.
D. State Doctrines of Responsibility
Many commentators have postulated extending doctrines of state
responsibility to impute liability for human rights abuses by PCMFs to
contracting states.454 Both international and domestic law have long recognized
the principle that states may be subject to violations of international law even
where the state has not directly committed the violation.455 The UN’s
International Law Commission, composed of thirty-four independent experts,
formulated “a set of ‘principles which govern the responsibility of States for
internationally wrongful acts’” that were later codified in the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility (“Draft Articles”).456 While the Draft Articles are not
453 Ominous Outlook for the UN Norms, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (March 22, 2006, 7:52 AM), http://www.
earthrights.org/about/news/ominous-outlook-un-norms.
454 See, e.g., Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions of Private
Military Firms, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 239 (2009); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
455 Ratner, supra note 454, at 449–90. The United States has also used the doctrine of attribution to hold
Iran liable for the acts of a private corporation, where the court found there was sufficient state control over the
corporation. See McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
1045 (1996).
456 Id. at 489; see also Jones, supra note 454, at 272.
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binding on the state, they may form customary international law. In fact, it was
the intent of the international community to use the instrument to “‘influence
the crystallization of the law of State responsibility through application by
international courts and tribunals and State practice,’ rather than progressing to
a Convention.”457
The Draft Articles divide state responsibility into two basic categories:
primary and secondary rules.458 “Primary rules are the substantive obligations
of states in the myriad subject areas of international law, from the law of the
sea to jurisdiction to the use of force.”459 “Secondary rules . . . concern the
attribution to the State of the violation of one of the obligations arising from
the primary rules, regardless of its origin, nature, or object. These secondary
rules apply to all international obligations and are generally characterized by
the concept of ‘attribution.’”460 Essentially, secondary rules place
responsibility upon the states for acts committed by state agents.461 Thus, the
Draft Articles create a framework within which states may be liable for illegal
actions that have been committed by another entity, so long as a nexus exists
between the state and the acting agent.
Even though the Draft Articles may not be formally binding vis-à-vis a
treaty or convention, imputing agent liability to states is becoming increasingly
recognized in international law, as evidenced by decisions from international
courts, authoritative resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council,
and state practice.462 For instance, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
recognized the possibility of the United States being held liable for the acts of
the Contras in their war against the Nicaraguan government, in Nicaragua vs.
United States.463 In its opinion, the ICJ stated:
In this respect, the Court notes that according to Nicaragua, the
contras are no more than bands of mercenaries which have been
recruited, organized, paid and commanded by the Government of the
United States. This would mean that they have no real autonomy in
relation to that Government. Consequently, any offences which they
have committed would be imputable to the Government of the United
457
458
459
460
461
462
463

27).

Jones, supra note 454, at 261.
Ratner, supra note 454, at 489–90.
Id. at 490.
Jones, supra note 454, at 257–58 (emphasis omitted).
Ratner, supra note 454, at 490.
Id. at 501.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
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States, like those of any other forces placed under the latter’s
command. In the view of Nicaragua, ‘stricto sensu, the military and
paramilitary attacks launched by the United States against Nicaragua
do not constitute a case of civil strife. They are essentially the acts of
the United States.’ If such a finding of the imputability of the acts of
the contras to the United States were to be made, no question would
arise of mere complicity in those acts, or of incitement of the contras
464
to commit them.

The ICJ held that the United States did not exert the amount of control
necessary to trigger principles of attribution, requiring a showing that the
United States had “effective control of the military or paramilitary operations
in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.”465 In 1999, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) found that
the Bosnian Serb army was a part of the larger Serbian armed forces and
applied the rules of attribution, holding Serbia liable for the acts of the Bosnian
Serb army.466 The ICTY employed a less rigorous test and found attribution
where the state “‘has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the military
actions’ of the group.”467 Thus, the ICTY reduced the evidentiary burden by
not requiring proof of direct state control over operations of the agent to trigger
attribution.468 However, the court would impute liability only if the state issued
“specific instructions concerning the commission of that particular act” or
“publicly endorsed or approved ex post facto.”469 This additional element again
requires a significant causal nexus between the state and agent in order to
impute liability using the rules of attribution.
Professor Steven Ratner has advocated the extension of the rules of
attribution to include violations by PCMFs in conflict or post-conflict zones,
stating, “This theory asserts that corporate duties are a function of four clusters
of issues: the corporation’s relationship with the government, its nexus to
affected populations, the particular human right at issue, and the place of
individuals violating human rights within the corporate structure.”470
Essentially, using the rules of attribution, two avenues exist to impute liability
to PCMFs. First, liability can be imputed if the corporate entity performs

464
465
466
467
468
469
470

Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Ratner, supra note 454, at 499.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 496–97.
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functions traditionally considered to be so inherently governmental that the
corporate entity should be considered an organ of the state.471 If the activities
of the corporation do not meet this burden, then the state may still be liable
under the second avenue for imputation—if the state has “overall control” over
the entity.472 Thus, applying one of these methods of attribution, a state could
potentially be liable for PCMF misconduct.
While using principles of attribution based on state responsibility may
provide a potential means of accountability, the theory falls short of providing
comprehensive regulation of PCMFs on several levels. First, the Draft Articles
are not binding and are, in fact, expressly intended to be non-binding. As such,
any legal argument based upon attribution must affirmatively demonstrate that
the Draft Articles have become part of customary international law. Second,
the international courts that have adjudicated claims involving state liability
have employed the “overall control” test, which requires a high evidentiary
burden of proof.473 Third, there is no designated international body that
monitors non-state actors, and although the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) may arguably exercise jurisdiction, the United States, as the largest
PCMF employer, has expressly repudiated its jurisdiction.474 Thus, it seems
very unlikely that PCMF misconduct will be legally imputable to the
employing state, and even assuming arguendo that liability were attributed,
there is no enforcement mechanism, particularly in the case of the United
States.
E. Contract Regulations
Currently, there is a lack of transparency in the PCMF marketplace,
resulting from failure to disclose contractual terms.475 The majority of PCMF
contracts are awarded on a no-bid basis, off the open market, while terms of
the contract are kept confidential from the public, compounding layers of
471

Jones, supra note 454, at 269–70.
Id. at 270. This would prevent states from claiming lack of knowledge of PCMF activity. Fainaru
describes this institutional ignorance:
472

As the merc[enaries] expanded their presence, there was a kind of institutionalized ignorance that
pervaded everything about them. It was as if the U.S. government desperately needed them to
prosecute its failing war, but wanted to know as little as possible about who they were, what they
did, and, especially, who was responsible for their actions.
FAINARU, supra note 58, at 24.
473 See id.
474 Jones, supra note 454, at 251.
475 See generally Dickinson, supra note 190, at 192.
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oversight and accountability issues.476 In fact, only $47 million in contracts
were awarded to companies bidding on the open market, leaving billions of
dollars of federal money awarded to PCMFs without any competition.477
Furthermore, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)
does not apply to the actions of private contractors. Although FOIA
does permit the public to request information about the terms of
contracts, the contractors essentially have a veto over the release of
contract terms if they contain “trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and [are] privileged or
confidential.” Thus, in many cases, the terms of the contracts are not
478
publicly available.

Additionally, even though requests to obtain military programs can be made,
these requests are often refused under the FOIA’s national security
exemption.479
PCMF contracts have taken two basic forms: “blanket purchase
agreements” and “cost-plus” contracts.480 Blanket purchase agreements, also
known as “indefinite delivery or indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) contracts,” allow
the procuring agency to enter task orders as the need arises, rather than
requesting specific services when the parties form the contract, leading to
open-ended, uncertain contractual terms.481 The structure of these contracts
obviates competitive bidding, resulting in monopolistic pricing practices.482
Additionally, cost-plus contracts are “structured so that the government agrees
to pay a fixed fee regardless of performance, which dramatically reduces or
eliminates incentives either to provide effective performance or to control
costs. Despite these serious problems with cost-plus contracts, they are
widespread in military contracting.”483 Because many of these contracts are
awarded on a no-bid basis, resulting in the elimination of market-control
476 Id. The absence of transparency is so pervasive in the PCMF industry that even journalists have failed
to adequately report on PCMFs, despite the sheer number of PCMFs exceeding their military counterparts. “In
total, out of well over 100,000 stories dealing with the war over that period, PEJ [the Project for Excellence in
Journalism] found only 248 stories dealing in some way with the topic of [PCMFs] . . . .” ISENBERG, supra
note 22, at 13. Of these 248, twenty were op-eds, and many were the same story re-run on different outlets. Id.
477 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 21. Sadly, the twenty largest PCMF contractors “spent nearly $300
million since 2000 lobbying and have donated $23 million to political campaigns.” Id. at 20; see also id. at 65.
478 Dickinson, supra note 190, at 192.
479 Id. at 194.
480 Id. at 200–04.
481 Id. at 204.
482 See id. at 201–05.
483 Id. at 203 (emphasis omitted).
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mechanisms, the potential for unscrupulous contracting practices rises
tremendously.484 Lastly, many contracts awarded to PCMFs are described as
“black,” or completely confidential.485 Not only does the public have no access
to the terms of the contract, but in fact, the contract’s entire existence is off the
record and there is no mechanism for any member of the public to procure
information about the contract.486 The problem is compounded by PCMFs
further sub-contracting their duties, resulting in layers of contracts, escalating
concerns of lack of accountability and oversight.487
Some commentators have advocated employing strict guidelines and
requirements within contractual provisions that would directly incorporate
public law values in the underlying contractual agreement.488 Because
contracts are the very instruments that facilitate the shift from the public realm
(of military duties) to the private sector, it follows that the contract should
codify the level of accountability to which a public actor would be subject.489
Thus, states could use the contract as the mechanism for eliminating the
disparity between the public and private spheres, by aligning interests and
accountability.490 In particular, one commentator, Laura Dickinson, has
suggested employing comprehensive regulations through contracts:
Contracts could also require compliance with specific performance
standards and include performance benchmarks, graduated penalties,
oversight by contract managers or independent observers, and
reporting requirements. Along with these front-end contractual terms
to enhance accountability, contracts could also encourage back-end
enforcement in the courts when these mechanisms fail. Contracts

484

See, e.g., id. at 192; SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 326–27.
See Laura Rozen, Black Contracts, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 10, 2005), http://www.prospect.org/cs/
articles?articleId=10719.
486 See id.
487 Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability,
Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1010–11 (2005) (“At a Congressional hearing about
Halliburton cost-overruns and inefficiencies, one of the witnesses, Marie deYoung, was an employee of
Halliburton and a former army captain. Marie deYoung testified that Halliburton subcontracted to companies
that in turn subcontracted, producing two or three layers of subcontracts. She concluded, ‘[w]e, essentially, lost
control of the project and paid between four to nine times what we needed to fund that project.’”).
488 See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 190, at 401–02. The term “public law,” as used by scholar Jody
Freeman, refers to the imposition on the government, through the Constitution primarily, and by extension to
entities to which the government outsources core government functions, “a host of obligations designed to
render decisionmaking open, accountable, rational, and fair.” Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms
Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1302 (2003).
489 Dickinson, supra note 169, at 199–200.
490 Id.
485
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could thus explicitly permit third-party beneficiary suits and even
491
allow relevant interest groups to bring suit in some contexts.

While Dickinson’s suggestions offer an excellent step in the regulation of
PCMFs, they still fall short of a comprehensive modality of accountability in
several fundamental ways. First, according to PCMF expert David Isenberg,
under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services contracts, the State
Department employs stringent levels of qualification and vetting.492
Nonetheless, despite the fact that performance standards exist, there was
neither oversight nor any enforcement mechanism when PCMF misconduct
occurred, demonstrating that contracts alone cannot regulate the industry.493
Second, even assuming a high level of oversight and enforcement, contracts
are still remain a source of civil law; therefore, any remedy owed as a result of
a breach of contract will be limited to placing the parties in the same position
they were prior to contract formation.494 Criminal law, in contrast, is punitive
and exists for the purposes of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.495 In the context of war and conflict, the potential for grave
violations of human rights abuses exists, rendering contractual remedies
patently inadequate. Third, using domestic contracts to regulate PCMF conduct
ignores the uniquely transnational characteristic of PCMFs. Domestic contracts
between the United States and a PCMF cannot provide a comprehensive
solution to the problem as there are other states and non-state actors that would
fall out of the purview of such a regulation.496 PCMFs are hired by many
different actors: the British government, the Iraqi government, and “a myriad
of private firms.”497 Fourth, because PCMFs employ individuals worldwide,
the PCMF may be unable to hold the individual contractor liable for even civil
claims. Because PCMFs are not state actors, it is difficult to fathom how a
PCMF would negotiate an extradition treaty or other instrument that would
ensure the PCMF would be capable of producing the individual contractor.
Fifth and finally, as Dickinson herself acknowledges, creating and using
government agencies to perform audits, monitor performance benchmarks,
491

Id. at 171.
ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 30–32.
493 See id.
494 See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 4 (6th ed.
2010). One proviso to this proposition is that a party may, in some circumstances, receive “expectation
damages,” which put a party in the position he or she would have realized had the contract been performed
properly. Id.
495 See SUE TITUS REID, CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (5th ed. 2001).
496 AVANT, supra note 30, at 7.
497 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 29.
492
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appoint contract managers, and provide general, overall PCMF industry
oversight would call for the creation of another complicated domestic
bureaucracy—one that would effectively diminish the cost savings of
outsourcing and thus eliminate the benefits of privatization.498
Dickinson concedes that her solution is not intended to be comprehensive,
stating, “Though the use of agreements is certainly not a panacea, contracts are
an under-explored tool for enforcing public law norms when the international
functions of government are transferred to private actors.”499 Having
mentioned where the proposal falls short, it is essential to acknowledge that
any system of comprehensive PCMF regulation must use contracts as one of
the methods of accountability. This Article’s primary argument is that contract
regulation, standing alone, cannot accomplish the type of international
regulation of PCMFs that is necessary. As such, Dickinson’s proposal provides
the framework for one of the essential components of PCMF regulation, but it
must be used in conjunction with other methods to ensure the legal
accountability gap is effectively closed.
F. Market Regulations
Industry leaders and commentators have also suggested using the open
market to regulate PCMFs: if a PCMF does not perform its duties efficiently
and legally, then it will either lose its contract with the government or will be
unable to renew or win another contract.500 Under this premise, commentators
argue that the PCMF has an added incentive to guarantee it is performing
under the highest ethical standards.501 This method of regulation presumes the
existence of an open, transparent, and fair market, which does not exist in the
PCMF context. The unfortunate reality is that PCMF contracts are often
awarded on a no-bid basis with ambiguous, indefinite terms.502 As one military
officer explains:
First, free market capitalism requires a competitive environment, yet
over the last 5 years over 40% of DoD contracts have been sole
source single bidder contracts. Second, free markets rely on
numerous customers, yet the military in particular or the government

498

Dickinson, supra note 169, at 171–72.
Id. at 181.
500 See Peter Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International
Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 545–46 (2004).
501 See id. at 542–44.
502 See supra Part V.E.
499
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in general is often the only customer. Finally[,] free market
capitalism rests on the assumption that consumers cannot pass on
economic inefficiencies, but the military can pass these losses to the
503
federal government and eventually the taxpayers.

Because traditional market forces do not govern PCMF contracts, it is
difficult to fathom how the market will be capable of providing a reliable
check or regulatory function. To further evidence this unfortunate truth, one
need not look further than three glaring examples of how market regulations
fail to provide accountability in the PCMF context. First, despite CACI’s direct
and proven involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal, the government not only
failed to revoke CACI’s original contract, but actually extended the contract.504
Furthermore, in March of 2010, CACI was awarded a $588 million indefinite
delivery and indefinite quantity contract to support the U.S. Navy’s Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Command’s command and control operations.505
Between 2004 and 2010, CACI was also awarded several multi-million dollar
contracts with the U.S. military and other federal government branches.506
Second, following the Nisour Square shootings in 2007, the State Department
announced it was renewing its contract with Blackwater for an additional year
in 2008, despite strong objections from the Iraqi government.507 However,
503 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 21 (quoting Marc O. Hedahl, Outsourcing the Profession: A Look at
Military Contractors and Their Impact on the Profession of Arms, INT’L SOC’Y FOR MILITARY ETHICS, http://
www.usafa.edu/isme/JSCOPE05/Hedahl05.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)).
504 Dickinson, supra note 169, at 201–02.
505 CACI Awarded Prime Contract on $588 Million, Multiple-Award Program with U.S. Navy’s Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command, DCTECHSOURCE.COM (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.dctechsource.com/
caci_awarded_contract_on_navy_space_and_naval_warfare_systems_command.aspx.
506 See, e.g., Michael Cheek, Contract Award–CACI–$23 Million–Army, GOVCON WIRE (Nov. 3, 2009),
http://www.govconwire.com/2009/11/contract-award-caci-23-million-army; Jon Greenwood, CACI Awarded
$38 Million Task Order from U.S. Army, GOVCON WIRE (May 15, 2009), http://www.govconwire.com/2009/
05/caci-awarded-38-million-task-order-from-us-army; Jack Mann, Army Renews CACI U.S. Army Battle
Command Systems Products for $100M, GOVCON WIRE (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.govconwire.com/2010/01/
army-renews-caci-us-army-battle-command-systems-products-for-100m; Jack Mann, CACI Wins $133 Million
National Security, Intelligence Community Contract, GOVCON WIRE (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.govconwire.
com/2009/08/caci-wins-133-million-national-security-intelligence-community-contract.
507 James Risen, Iraq Contractor in Shooting Case Makes Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2008)
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/10/world/middleeast/10blackwater.html. Indeed, the Iraqi government
announced that Blackwater’s license would be revoked and further banned it from operating in the country.
SINGER, supra note 1, at 253. However, there were two problems:

Blackwater, which was one of the biggest firms operating in Iraq at the time, actually had no
license with the Iraqi Interior Ministry for them to revoke (illustrating the complete lack of
controls and mismanagement within this space), and kicking out the company would leave the
U.S. State Department in Iraq without security in the middle of a war zone. It was a classic case
of over-outsourcing. The U.S. government’s diplomatic security force had been hollowed out at
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because the Iraqi government denied Blackwater a license to operate as a
contractor company, the U.S. government decided not to renew the contract
after its expiration in May of 2009.508 It is important to note that the decision to
allow the contract to expire was out of respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, as
contrasted with market forces effectuating regulations. This is clear, as
Blackwater is likely to receive another multi-million dollar contract in
Afghanistan.509 Third, despite repeated allegations of fraud and abuse—
including a lawsuit filed by the U.S. government alleging overcharges510 and
negligence in the treatment of water511 and the installation of electrical
systems, which resulted in the electrocution and death of two U.S.
servicemen512—the government awarded KBR a $2.8 billion contract for
support work in Iraq in March of 2010.513 The facts are indisputable: market
forces are simply ineffective to provide a regulatory function and are
completely incapable of providing accountability—“[e]xcessive use of private
contractors erodes checks and balances, and it substitutes market transactions,
controlled by the executive branch, for traditional political mechanisms of
accountability.”514

the same time the need for it expanded . . . . The embassy was so reliant on the company that it
had no back-up plan for what to do without them.
Id.
508 U.S Nixes Blackwater Contract For Iraq, CBS NEWS (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2009/01/30/iraq/main4764933.shtml. Prior to 2009, the State Department had continued to employ
Blackwater in Iraq, stating that the contract was between the U.S. government and Blackwater and thus did not
require an Iraqi license. ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 79.
509 Spencer Ackerman, Systematic Failures May Give Blackwater Another Afghanistan Contract, WASH.
INDEP. (Mar. 8, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://washingtonindependent.com/78537/systemic-failures-may-giveblackwater-another-afghanistan-contract. Furthermore, there is evidence that there is a Blackwater presence in
Pakistan as well. Declan Walsh & Ewen MacAskill, Blackwater Operating at CIA Pakistan Base, Ex-official
Says, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 11, 2009, 7:26 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/11/blackwaterin-cia-pakistan-base.
510 Devlin Barrett, US Sues Contractor KBR Over Iraq Bills, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2010), http://abcnews.
go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10263216.
511 Dana Hedgpeth, KBR Faulted on Water Provided to Soldiers, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2008), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/10/AR2008031002487.html.
512 Kimberly Hefling, KBR Gets $35M Contract Despite Electrocutions, ARMY TIMES (Feb. 7, 2009, 5:03
PM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/ap_kbr_contract_020709/.
513 Sananda Sahoo, Lucrative KBR Contracts Unaffected by Troop Drawdown, IPS N. AM. (Apr. 7, 2010),
http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=2978.
514 ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 21.
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G. Extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
The MEJA was enacted in November 2000, granting the United States
jurisdiction over members of the military for felonies committed abroad,
punishable by incarceration for over a year, “if the conduct had been engaged
in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.”515 As previously
mentioned, the SMTJ limits extraterritorial jurisdiction to “any place or
residence in a foreign state used by missions or entities of the U.S. government
with respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United
States.”516 Therefore, the conduct must occur on a military base or property
owned or used by another recognizable U.S. entity.517 In response to the
jurisdictional gap over the contractors in the Abu Ghraib scandal, Congress
amended the MEJA in 2004 to extend jurisdiction over those “accompanying
the Armed Forces outside the United States,”518 including civilian contractors
directly employed by the Department of Defense or employed by another
federal agency “supporting the mission of the Department of Defense
overseas.”519
While the 2004 MEJA amendment attempts to include language to broaden
the scope of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, it still falls short in several
fundamental ways. First, it is unclear what type of factual showing is necessary
to demonstrate that contractors were employed in support of “the mission of
the Department of Defense” where another federal agency has employed the
PCMF.520 Second, the stringent geographic limitations still exist, ignoring that
many contractors engage in activities in zones outside of the SMTJ.521 Third,
extraterritorial jurisdiction is limited to those crimes which carry a punishment
for a year.522 Fourth, interestingly,
MEJA was never designed to apply to military/security missions or
the context of conflict zones (its point of origin was a family abuse

515

18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2006).
Giardino, supra note 104, at 715; see Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2006).
517 See Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
518 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2) (2006).
519 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
520 See United States v. Gleason, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24800 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 2009) (finding that the
defendant’s employment was related to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense, but declining to
lay out a test or enumerate specific factors to determine if the action supported the mission).
521 See Craig Jordan, Who Will Guard the Guards? The Accountability of Private Military Contractors in
Areas of Armed Conflict, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 309, 319–20 (2009).
522 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2006).
516
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case at a US base in Germany) and has proven to be pretty much
mythical in application to the contractor world (the only MEJA case
523
activated was a domestic dispute at a base in Turkey).

For these reasons, commentators have argued that MEJA, even in its
amended form, is incapable of regulating PCMF conduct adequately.524
Some commentators have suggested amending MEJA to broaden the scope
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.525 This may be a viable option if implemented in
conjunction with a broader international obligation to prosecute PCMF
misconduct. Currently, the MEJA grants discretionary extraterritorial
jurisdiction, but does not require prosecution.526 Furthermore, due to poor
governmental oversight over PCMFs and the lack of adequate reporting by
PCMFs for misconduct, there is no mechanism for collecting data in order to
prosecute.527 The MEJA could be used as a vehicle for domestic jurisdiction,
but not without significant changes. Further, there must be international
commitments requiring prosecution of PCMFs by contracting states if the
MEJA is to be effective.

523 Peter Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and its Applicability to Private
Military Contractors, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 17, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/
0112defenseindustry_singer.aspx. Specifically, MEJA was written after a man sexually abused his thirteenyear-old daughter on a military base in Germany. CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 114. The man was a civilian,
and his conviction was overturned because U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction over crimes committed by civilians
on U.S. bases abroad. Id. MEJA was established to enable “the prosecution of non-military family members on
US bases by allowing investigators . . . and prosecutors to apply US criminal law outside of the territorial US.”
Id.
524 David Isenberg, A Government in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq, in FROM
MERCENARIES TO MARKET 82, 87–88 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007). Peter Singer evaluates
the problems with the MEJA, introducing the hypothetical case of a drunk contractor killing an Iraqi. Singer,
supra note 523. While Singer calls this case hypothetical, a drunk Blackwater contractor actually did kill the
Iraqi security guard of the Vice President of Iraq. See SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 10. Singer notes some of the
difficulties associated with MEJA:

Some US attorney would have had to decide to prosecute the accused, even though the victim
and accused wasn’t in his district, fly out to the base in Iraq multiple times, try to track down and
depose witnesses (who most likely would have been deployed all over the place to avoid him),
and then sell it to a jury back in the US, likely spending his entire yearly budget on one case
when he is actually being judged by his bosses on his prosecutions of a lacrosse team, gang
violence, or whatever. They would decide it’s a loser and most likely bury it in an “open file”
somewhere. And this is if there were no political pressures, and the accused was actually in
custody, which military folks haven’t been putting contractors in when they know of such events.
Singer, supra note 523.
525 See generally Jordan, supra note 521.
526 See SINGER, supra note 1, at 239.
527 See generally id. at 152–54.

YASIN GALLEYSFINAL

482

7/7/2011 9:29 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

H. Creation of an International Body
PCMF expert Peter Singer advocates the creation of an international body
to regulate PCMFs.528 He suggests gathering a body of international experts
that would represent the interests of all stakeholders and convene “a special
task force on the industry under the auspices of the UN Secretary General and
his Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism.”529 Further, the task force could
provide overall regulatory functions by auditing and vetting PCMFs and thus
implicitly designating them as “sanctioned businesses.”530 Additionally, the
task force could be charged with reviewing contracts and armed with the right
of refusal—which would eliminate the possibility of PCMFs working for
“unsavory clients or engag[ing] in contracts that are contrary to the public
good.”531 If PCMFs violated contractual terms, the task force could implement
some measure of punishment.
Singer’s task force recommendation provides the first real step in
regulating PCMFs. Because this Article recognizes that the PCMF issue is an
international problem requiring an international solution, it follows that the
regulation too must, on some level, be based on international consensus. The
task force would serve as the underlying basis for this Article’s regulatory
framework and would be the primary mechanism by which PCMF status
would be explicitly designated and the corresponding legal obligations
attached.
VI. A STATUS-BASED FRAMEWORK THAT PROVIDES PCMF ACCOUNTABILITY
AND PROTECTION
“Perhaps no function of government is deemed more quintessentially a
‘state’ function than the military protection of the state itself. Indeed, scholars
of privatization in the domestic sphere have often assumed that privatization of
the military is one area where privatization does not, or should not, occur.”532
528

Id. at 241.
Id.
530 Id.
531 Id.
532 Dickinson, supra note 169, at 147. Washington Post journalist Steve Fainaru described the PCMF
situation on the ground as follows:
529

The mercs ran with M-4s and 9mm Glocks, the same caliber weapons used by U.S. troops. They
occupied the same battle space as the military and ran the same bomb-seeded roads. But, unlike
the troops, who operated under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a legal framework dating
back to the Second Continental Congress, the mercs were untouchable. None of the prevailing
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This point becomes even more poignant when distinguishing PCMFs and the
military’s discipline and organizational cultures.533 Militaries “have distinctive
institutional cultures that can impose strong internal sanctions for wrongdoing.
This institutional culture is very different from that found in [the PCMF
industry].”534 Furthermore, militaries are rigidly hierarchical organizations that
transcend ordinary civilian or traditional business-model hierarchies.535 The
military possesses its own internal justice system, as codified by the UCMJ, to
enforce the standards of conduct with stringent punitive measures, if
necessary.536 However, there is no parallel criminal or civil system with regard
to PCMFs, which, in many ways, are serving the same function and performing
the same tasks. Thus, military service people are prosecuted and punished for
conduct identical to that of their PCMF counterparts, who are accorded
complete immunity.537 In essence, a privatized military force has been created,
which, in practical terms, is unrestrained by the laws governing warfare and
human rights, leading to the potential “to undermine the culture of institutional
accountability that does exist.”538 The irony, therefore, is that the environment
within which PCMFs operate is by-and-large identical to that of the military,
yet PCMFs are not subject to any of the stringent regulations to which the
laws—Iraqi law, U.S. law, the UCMJ, Islamic law, the Geneva Conventions—applied to them.
Shortly after he was hired by Triple Canopy, Chuck Sheppard, a former Ranger, began to wonder
what would happen if he shot someone. What if there was a dispute? What if an Iraqi tried to
press charges? Sheppard said Triple Canopy executives reassured him. “We were always told,
from the very beginning, if for some reason something happened and they were trying to
prosecute us under Iraqi law, they would put you in the back of a car and sneak you out of the
country in the middle of the night. It was comforting. But we never saw nothin’ on paper.”
FAINARU, supra note 58, at 19.
533 This contrasts greatly with their military counterparts, who are subject to a strict code of conduct. The
UCMJ has an extensive punitive code, establishing punishments from seemingly innocuous conduct, such as
“disrespect toward superior commissioned,” to more serious offenses such as burglary, rape, and murder. See
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 889, 929, 920, 918 (2006). In contrast, civilian contractors are
not subject to any specific code and have in fact escaped liability in cases identical to those in which military
personnel have faced stringent penalties. See Singer, supra note 523.
534 Dickinson, supra note 169, at 208. See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–
926 (2006).
535 Dickinson, supra note 169, at 208.
536 Id. at 208–09.
537 Scott Horton, Security Contractors Immune from Torture Charges, Judges Rule, HARPER’S MAG.
(Sept. 14, 2009, 10:42 AM), http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/09/hbc-90005706 (discussing the civil and
criminal immunity of CACI and Titan contractors for their misconduct in the Abu Ghraib prisons);
Prosecutions and Convictions: A Look at Accountability to Date for Abuses at Abu Ghraib and in the Broader
“War on Terror,” SALON.COM (Mar. 14, 2006, 4:03 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/abu_ghraib/
2006/03/14/prosecutions_convictions (discussing the charges and convictions of members of the military in
relation to the Abu Ghraib scandal).
538 Dickinson, supra note 169, at 211.
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military are subject. As PCMF expert David Isenberg noted, “[T]he difference
between the private and public soldiers appears to revolve largely around the
form of employment contract.”539 Indeed, perhaps more disconcerting is that
PCMFs often recruit directly from active military servicemen.540 To date, the
international community, through its failure to regulate, has simply ignored the
growth and evolution of this industry, while contracting states have taken
advantage of this rather fortuitous loophole.541
International and domestic law must adapt to bring PCMFs within the
purview of a legal framework that would accord both accountability and
protection based on assigning PCMFs a definitive legal status. The current
legal no-man’s-land is neither tenable nor pragmatic—leaving crimes and torts
committed by PCMFs unpunished only opens the floodgates for graver human
rights violations. Further, the absence of any legal consensus regarding PCMFs
results in uncertainties and inconsistent results. For example, which states have
jurisdiction to prosecute, what laws govern misconduct, and to whom—or
alternatively, to what—is the PCMF responsible? The international community
must provide definitive answers to these looming questions. The PCMF
conundrum is an international problem requiring an international solution
analogous to the treaties, conventions, and declarations governing warfare and
human rights. “Whatever the legal niceties, war in the final analysis comes
down to the regulated use of force.”542 PCMFs operate in conditions similar to
warfare, with the potential for committing grave human rights, but fall within a
539
540

ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 16.
Id. at 60. A retired U.S. Army officer wrote:
It’s fundamentally wrong to let contractors go head-hunting among our troops in
wartime. . . . You get stuck with the training and security-clearance costs; the soldier lured to the
private sector gets his salary doubled or tripled—then the contractor adds in a markup for his
multiple layers of overhead costs and a generous profit margin, and bills the taxpayers.

Id. A U.S. Marine noted, “[T]he military is essentially buying out its most experienced soldiers and luring
them out of the active ranks . . . with rich contracts, even as it desperately seeks new recruits.” Id. at 62.
541 In 2007, Congressman Henry Waxman addressed the impunity issue with regard to Blackwater in a
House of Representatives hearing, stating:
New documents indicate that there have been a total of 195 shooting incidents [in a two-year
span] involving Blackwater forces since 2005. Blackwater’s contract says the company is hired
to provide defensive services, but in most of these incidents it was Blackwater forces who fired
first. We have also learned that 122 Blackwater employees, one seventh of the company’s current
work force in Iraq, have been terminated for improper conduct.
CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 100.
542 Charles Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?’—Dilemmas on the Use of Force, 14 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 499, 499 (2009).
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loophole of accountability. Thus, it is crucial to implement an international
regulatory framework coupled with a domestic enforcement mechanism.
The majority of scholarship regarding PCMFs attempts to include PCMFs
in a pre-existing legal definition or body of law.543 While all of these theories
are helpful in understanding just how muddled the law governing PCMFs has
become, none of them, taken individually, provides a holistic analytical
approach. Unfortunately, the majority of the opinions try to fit a square into a
circle by attempting to include the vast, relatively amorphous area of PCMFs
into existing legal avenues of relief. Although this may provide an interim
solution, it fails to create a reliable legal framework that will yield consistent
results. Therefore, this Article argues for the creation of an entirely new
framework, building upon many of the theories currently suggested to regulate
PCMFs. In many ways, this framework is a conglomerate of existing theories,
with the addition of clearly demarcated status-based definitional
accountability. The distinguishing elements between this framework and
existing theories are both the addition of defined legal statuses based on the
specific functions PMCFs are performing, and the extent to which the
framework will be internationally and domestically implementable.
Admittedly, this framework will not and cannot address every possible legal
issue that can arise involving PCMFs, but it will provide a holistic approach
that can serve as a starting point for the implementation of a coherent body of
law governing PCMFs. While one might object that these issues could be
resolved using a scalpel, not a sledgehammer, based on the current
schizophrenic legal approach addressing PCMFs, a systematic overhaul would
be more logical and cohesive.
A. Multilateral Treaty and Enforcement: Nuts and Bolts
This Article suggests the creation of a comprehensive multilateral treaty
that defines the status of PCMFs, delineates jurisdiction, and provides for
mandatory domestic enforcement in response to any violations of the treaty
norms that occur. Since PCMFs serve as gap-fillers for military operations,
there must be a legal gap-filler that can adequately regulate the industry in the
same way that state militaries self-regulate.544 As previously discussed, Singer

543
544

See supra Part II.
Such a gap-filler would eliminate the problem of PCMF accountability.
If you are a U.S. soldier and you hurt an Iraqi civilian and that becomes known, you will be
court-marshaled. But if you are a contractor and you kill an Iraqi civilian and that becomes
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has proposed the creation of a public international body (“PIB”), “formed
under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Rapporteur on
Mercenarism.”545 Ideally, the PIB could be created by formulating a
multilateral treaty with a self-executing mechanism in signatory states.
Building upon Singer’s proposal and supplementing theories postulated by
others, this Article refines the role of the PIB and the corresponding state
responsibilities. The PIB would be led by a task force that includes members
from all of the various stakeholders: state actors, human rights NGOs, PCMFs
themselves, as well as experts on international human rights law and
humanitarian laws.546 The task force would be responsible for: (1) creating
status-based categories defining the type of PCMF; (2) determining codes of
acceptable conduct, accountability, and protection relative to ascribed status;
(3) registering, auditing, and providing ongoing oversight of PCMF activities;
and (4) providing a mandatory requirement for contracting states to prosecute
PCMFs in cases of misconduct.
B. Creating Categories Defining the Type of PCMF: Addressing Status547
Any privately held corporation that performs either direct or ancillary
duties in furtherance of warfare, nation-building, peace-keeping, or
maintenance in a conflict-ridden area on behalf of either state or non-state
actors would be covered generally as a PCMF. Therefore, to meet the general
definition of a PCMF and trigger application of the treaty, a corporation must
meet three elements: the corporation must be (1) a privately held corporation;
(2) performing direct or ancillary duties; (3) in furtherance of the
known, you will be sent home. And then you can come back the following week and work for a
different contractor.
IRAQ FOR SALE, supra note 157; see also SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 22–23. The two military operatives
involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal were sentenced collectively to eighteen years. IRAQ FOR SALE, supra note
157. The civilian contractors from whom the military had been receiving orders were not charged or penalized
in any way. Id. Furthermore, a 2008 study conducted by Human Rights First found the following:
To date more than 60 military personnel have been court-martialed in the deaths of Iraqi citizens
and more are under investigation. In contrast not one private contractor implicated in similar
crimes in Iraq has been prosecuted . . . . The Justice Department’s neglect has created a ‘shoot
first, ask questions later—or never’ attitude amongst some contractors.
CARMOLA, supra note 172, at 99 (citation omitted).
545 Singer, supra note 500, at 545.
546 Id. Being overly inclusive with the stakeholders ensures fairness, checks and balances, and
transparency encompassing all countervailing interests. See id. at 545–46.
547 It is essential to note that these categories have not been definitively defined in the current scholarship.
This status-based definitional analysis has grown out of Singer’s descriptions of PCMFs.
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aforementioned activities. Once a corporation meets the broad definition of a
PCMF, the subcategory of the PCMF’s legal status should be determined. As
discussed at length in Part III of this Article, there are six general categories of
PCMFs that should be defined as follows:
(A) Military Provider Firm: A firm that provides (a) direct engagement in (b)
armed conflict between (c) states or non-state actors, (d) supplies weaponry or
utilizes weaponry supplied by the employer, and (e) is physically present and
actively combating in warfare.
(B) Military Security Defense Firm: A firm that provides (a) security and
defense of (b) structures, vehicles (air, land, and sea), or persons, (c) has access
to or is required to carry firearms, and (d) in furtherance of these duties, has a
reasonable expectation of utilizing firearms, ammunition, or other weaponry in
defense of the mission.
(C) Military Intelligence Firm: A firm that procures intelligence through (a)
direct or indirect interrogation, (b) aerial or ground surveillance, or (c)
decoding and analyzing data.
(D) Military Consultant Firm: A firm that provides (a) advice, expertise,
analysis (b) directly related to offensive strategy or defensive security (c)
covering intelligence, combat, or security (among other things), including both
consultative and physical training and support, and (d) is not physically present
in the implementation thereof.
(E) Military Logistics Firm: A firm that provides (a) logistical support
including, but not limited to, transportation, cargo delivery, and supply
delivery, (b) in support of military or peacekeeping operations, but (c) is not
directly engaged in these operations, and (d) is on reasonable notice of
potential lethal attacks or conflict-related violence.
(F) Military Support Firm: A firm that provides (a) ancillary support to the
client’s mission (b) including, but not limited to, construction, overall
maintenance of facilities, and dining, (c) with no reasonable notice of being
subject to conflict-related violence.
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C. Determining Codes of Acceptable Conduct, Accountability, and
Protection548
The PIB must codify legal accountability to ensure PCMF compliance with
international law norms; it does not have to reinvent the wheel. In fact, it
would be far more effective and efficient if the PIB were to simply incorporate
established customary international law, conventions governing the laws of
war, treaties regarding human rights law, and judgments by international
criminal courts or tribunals on war crimes (such as judgments of the ICC).
However, incorporation of the laws of war should include one caveat—while
many of the laws of war are triggered only by the recognition of an “armed
conflict,” in the case of the PCMF activity, this restriction should be lifted to
better reflect the environment in which they operate.549 This body of law will
include law that is accepted and applied globally, essentially providing the
comprehensive international law governing warfare and human rights. Ideally,
the codification will also include provisions on safety, labor, and employment
standards for the protection of the individual contractors of the PCMF.550
Rather than building anew, the codification will simply reflect widely
established international law, but it will apply the law appropriately to the
PCMFs on the basis of status. Thus, the degree and range of accountability will
be determined by the PCMFs’ assigned category.
In this context, it is helpful again to refer to the “tip of the spear” analogy.
Those PCMFs engaging in traditional military combat should be bound to
follow the same conduct required by states, as codified by international laws
governing warfare and human rights, and should also enjoy “combatant” status
if captured.551 Thus, contractors would not be tried criminally for conduct that
the military would be privileged to perform.552 In fact, being accorded this
status would protect contractors from violating “the law of war itself, because
only combatants are lawfully allowed to engage in hostilities.”553 MPFs,
548 Because to date, no status-based definitions exist, it follows that the accountability discussed in this
Article has not been identified in contemporary scholarship. However, using Singer’s “tip of the spear”
approach, this Author has chosen to assign legal accountability and liability to PCMFs based on their
resemblance to state-based militaries.
549 See generally Brooks, supra note 158.
550 See ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 40–41 (discussing pay discrimination between employees working in
industrialized nations and those working in developing nations).
551 Ironically, the Labor Department does not distinguish between logistics and support contractors, and
military security and defense contractors. Id. at 14.
552 See Shawn McCormack, Private Security Contractors in Iraq Violate the Laws of War, 31 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 75, 98 (2007).
553 Id.
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MSDFs, and MIFs should also be bound by the same laws, since these
operations are also traditionally associated with state militaries and because of
the high likelihood of engaging in violent combat and discharging firearms or
other weaponry. While MIFs may not be physically present during violent
conflict per se, the capacity for violating human rights exists, as MIFs are
capable of exerting complete control over those interrogated, and thus could
potentially circumvent traditional rules of engagement for prisoners of war.
MCFs, which provide off-the-field expertise, should be accountable for any
training that would be a per se violation of human rights—such as teaching
methods of torture, even if there were no reasonable belief that the client
intended to employ torture. Additionally, MCFs should be subject to this
scrutiny if any human rights violations result directly from the MCF training
and a sufficient nexus exists between the training and the conduct complained
of. This scrutiny would protect MCFs generally, because any military training
could foreseeably result in a human rights violation. For instance, if a client
sought training for the pursuit of a violation of human rights (such as ethnic
cleansing or genocide) and the MCF had either actual or constructive
knowledge of the client’s underlying purpose, the MCF would be liable as a
tacit participator for any violation of international humanitarian law. Willful
ignorance would not provide an adequate defense.
Both MLFs and MSFs are treated significantly differently from the other
firms because their roles are distinct from any conflict-related violence. Thus,
neither MLFs nor MSFs should be subject to the laws governing warfare.
However, because MLFs are performing their duties in inherently dangerous
conditions, they should be afforded prisoner of war status and all associated
protections.554 Lastly, because MSFs are typically so distant, theoretically and
practically, from the violence of conflict zones, they should simply be treated
as civilians without any special accountability or protective mechanisms.
D. Registering, Auditing, and Providing Ongoing Oversight and Assistance
The PIB must require any company falling within the broad definition of a
PCMF to register the corporation as such.555 If a company fails to register itself
as a PCMF and attempts to perform in that capacity, there should be a
presumptive violation of the treaty’s provisions. Furthermore, the contracting

554 This status is in contrast to mercenaries, who are offered no such protection. See Govern & Bales,
supra note 81, at 80.
555 Singer, supra note 500, at 544–49.
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client should be held equally liable for contracting with an unregistered PCMF.
Registration must include the names of the CEO, COO, Board of Directors,
and all other material positions.556 This will allow the PIB to properly vet any
industry insider and guarantee that the PCMF is a legitimate corporation that
respects human rights.557 Additionally, vetting will prevent a corporation that
has been barred from performing any PCMF activities from simply changing
its name or reincorporating in a different state to rebrand itself.558 This
registration process will ensure a heightened level of transparency and
accountability. The registration information must include a detailed description
of the services the corporation is offering in the global PCMF market.
Obviously, the PCMF cannot provide a comprehensive and thorough
description of every service, given that this may impinge upon trade secrets or
reduce competitive advantage. Nonetheless, the corporation should describe its
services and request assignment to the corresponding category. If the PCMF
wishes to exceed its scope, it must file an amendment to the registration.
Without an amendment, a PCMF performing duties without requisite
authorization will be penalized and potentially risk losing its privilege to
perform as a PCMF.
One of the components of registration should be that PCMFs pay annual
dues to maintain membership. This requirement would provide the necessary
funding for the operational expenses of the PIB. A dues requirement is by no
means an extraordinary measure; professional organizations (such as state bar
associations and medical licensing boards) often require membership dues as a
prerequisite to participating in any professional activity. Furthermore, serving
partially in the scope of a professional organization, the PIB should ensure that
556

See id. at 545–46 (mentioning executives).
Id. Regulation will also serve to regulate the corruption that has been pervasive between governments
and the PCMFs. “Blackwater has recruited key individuals from the government and now Blackwater is
getting key governmental contracts. You do the math.” IRAQ FOR SALE, supra note 157. A notorious firm,
Custer Battles, was awarded a $16 million contract to guard Baghdad’s airport. ISENBERG, supra note 22, at
87. The company essentially was a sham corporation with no experience in security, and which overcharged
the government and was later sued for fraud. Id. at 87–91.
558 Blackwater, in an attempt to rebrand itself from its bad publicity, renamed the company Xe and
changed its logo. Blackwater Changes Its Name to Xe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A10; August Cole, U.S.
News: Blackwater Puts on a New Public Face, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, at A6. KBR moved its
headquarters to Dubai and there is speculation that it will reincorporate there. Michelle Tsai, Halliburton Says
Salaam: How Much Will Halliburton Save in U.S. Taxes?, SLATE (March 12, 2007, 6:46 PM), http://www.
slate.com/id/2161652. Vetting a corporation means ensuring the PCMF is also vetting its employees, using
uniform and stringent standards. Currently, “there is no uniform government requirement for vetting of
contractors.” ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 106. There have been many instances of contractors being fired by
one company in Iraq, only to be rehired by another, due to lack of proper vetting procedures. Id. at 141.
557
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PCMFs: (a) are trained in the laws governing warfare and human rights; (b)
have implemented corporate codes of conduct reflecting their legal obligations;
(c) have stringent employment background checks to guarantee that the
applicant has not worked for a state military for at least one year—reducing the
potential for active military to leave for the private sector—and also ensure the
applicant has not been convicted of any violent crimes or dishonorably
discharged from the military; (d) have a system of reporting and investigating
any alleged PCMF misconduct, both internally and externally, while ensuring
whistleblower protection; and (e) have a clearly demarcated hierarchical chain
of accountability and punishment for misconduct.
Once a company has been registered to operate as a PCMF, the company
must submit any potential contract for authorization by the PIB.559 In fact, the
international community should not consider any contract valid unless and
until it is authorized. Again, failure to follow proper protocol should result in
penalties or loss of PCMF status. This contract authorization requirement
would provide the following basic functions: first, the PIB can ensure that the
PCMF is not contracting with questionable actors for a despicable purpose;
second, the PIB can ensure that, within the contract, the PCMF has codified all
of the international human rights norms; third, the PIB can allocate liability by
requiring all contracts and subcontracts to be registered; and fourth, the PIB
would be guaranteed that the PCMF is in fact capable of performing the
services offered effectively.560 Finally, and most importantly, this requirement
will provide transparency and serve to effectively eradicate no-bid, GSA, or
“black” contracts, and will provide oversight to dubious sub-contracts.561
559 SINGER, supra note 1, at 241–42. This will also provide an oversight mechanism, ensuring that PCMFs
are actually capable of providing the services they are offering. Id. At the advent of the Iraq war, many PCMFs
began popping up, marketing services that they were not equipped to provide using a reasonable standard of
care. IRAQ FOR SALE, supra note 157. For instance, CACI and Titan, the two companies involved in the Abu
Ghraib scandal, were hired to provide intelligence services. Id. The contractors were supposed to translate and
interrogate. Id. In many cases, the contractors did not have a sufficient grasp of the Arabic language and thus
were unable to effectively communicate with detainees. Id. The result was contractors who tortured detainees
and provided incorrect military intelligence, which was later relied upon. Id.
560 On March 30, 2004, four Blackwater contractors were killed and their bodies were mangled when they
were attempting to transport kitchen materials from Baghdad to Fallujah. SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 162, 166–
68. The contractors were not given appropriate directions to reach their destination, they were not adequately
armed or manned, and their vehicles did not have any bulletproofing. Id. at 160–63. When the families of the
Blackwater employees tried to sue for wrongful death, it became evident very quickly that Blackwater had
entered into various layers of subcontracts to the extent that it was unclear from which entity Blackwater had
actually received the authority to transport the goods. Id. at 155–68. If the PIB has authorized all of the
contracts and subcontracts, investigations and prosecutions to determine liability will be much easier and more
transparent.
561 See supra Part V.E.
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Additionally, the PIB should perform an auditing function to ensure that
PCMFs are properly accounting for all their contracts and are not engaging in
any improper conduct or off-the-record contracts.562 Again, idiosyncrasies in
accounting could lead to sanctions if there were grounds to suspect
impropriety.563 Generally, the PIB should provide overall oversight and also
ongoing training, when necessary, to ensure that PCMF conduct rises to the
level accepted by international norms, particularly in the area of human rights.
The PIB is in a better position to provide overall oversight because it would
not have a conflict of interest. In contrast, often times state governments will
be beholden to certain corporate special interests and thus in less of a position
to provide this function effectively.564 Indeed,
[s]ometimes national governments, because of domestic political
pressures, realize that international regulation of a transnational
activity or the settlement of a cross-border dispute by a supranational
authority (an international institution, tribunal, or private body) may
offer superior outcomes. Elite associations in national jurisdictions
(whether bureaucrats or interest groups) may favor the “elevation” of
an issue or matter to an international mechanism precisely to avoid or
subvert domestic legislative or judicial bodies that might have been
565
“captured” by more parochial interests.

562 Halliburton is currently under investigation for charging the government $1.8 billion for meals and
services it never provided. IRAQ FOR SALE, supra note 157. Also, KBR has charged the government exorbitant
rates under a cost-plus contract—$45 for a six-pack of soda and $100 per bag of laundry. Id. Cost-plus
contracts pay a contractor for all of its actual expenses and then allow an additional payment for the contractor
to make a profit. Defense Industrial Initiatives Current Issue: Cost Plus Contracts, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUD., http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081016_diig_cost_plus.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). Under
the cost-plus contract, KBR has a perverse incentive to spend more, because it is guaranteed to be reimbursed
for the actual cost plus a profit. The effect is alarming—KBR was charged with burning brand new computer
equipment and vehicles because they did not fit certain specifications. IRAQ FOR SALE, supra note 157. An
October 2007 report revealed that the State Department so terribly mismanaged “a $1.2 billion contract for
Iraqi police training that it [could not] figure out what it got for the money spent.” ISENBERG, supra note 22, at
95.
563 See, e.g., ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 97. According to a 2006 audit, Erinys, a PCMF, “was paid $104
million to train at least 14,400 guards. Government auditors could find evidence of only 11,400 guards who
had been trained. They also could not determine the location of more than 6,000 AK-47s purchased for the
guards.” Id.
564 See Ken Silverstein, Revolving Door to Blackwater Causes Alarm at CIA, HARPER’S MAG. (Sept. 12,
2006), http://www.harpers.org/archive/2006/09/sb-revolving-door-blackwater-1158094722 (discussing the
revolving door between Blackwater and the government).
565 Bederman, supra note 201, at 230–31. To illustrate this point, one can simply look at the domestic
political situation regarding PCMFs in the United States. For instance, President Obama expressly stated
during his 2007–2008 campaign for the presidency that he would ensure that the PCMF industry would be
regulated more, contracts would be open to auditing, and that PCMFs would only be employed under
necessary circumstances. A 21st Century Military for America: Barack Obama on Defense Issues,
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E. Creating a Domestic Mechanism of Enforcement
To be effective, the multilateral treaty must provide for mandatory
domestic prosecution and civil remedies for PCMF misconduct by prosecuting
states. Thus, analogous to the United States’s incorporating the laws of war
and human rights in the UCMJ, Congress must also pass statutes incorporating
the treaty’s provision into domestic law. While some have suggested amending
the MEJA, it would be more prudent to create a statute specifically for PCMFs,
providing the industry ample notice for potential prosecutions. Additionally,
there is no viable jurisdictional vehicle for contractors to file civil suits in U.S.
domestic courts, short of the Alien Torts Statute, the scope of which the
Supreme Court significantly limited in Sosa.566 Therefore, Congress should
pass a criminal and civil jurisdictional vehicle to comprehensively cover all
PCMF behavior where the United States is the contracting state or where the
PCMF is a registered corporation in the United States.
There should be a limited exception to states exercising mandatory
jurisdiction to prosecute. This exception should be limited to instances in
which the state where the conduct occurred asserts jurisdiction or an
international tribunal prosecutes the case. Unfortunately, it is a reality that
PCMFs tend to operate in weak and failing states; therefore, these failing
states’ ability to provide an adequate judicial system may be questionable.567
Indeed, “[a] weak state may also be forced, out of strategic necessity, to
overlook human rights abuses committed by [PCMFs] in its effort to complete
its military operation in the most efficient manner possible.”568 In cases where
the host state will not prosecute, the contracting state should maintain a legal
obligation to do so. Alternatively, if the host state is also the contracting
state—as was the case with EO in Africa—and is unable or unwilling to
BARACKOBAMA.COM, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/Defense_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf. In 2007, Obama
stated, “We cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable
contractors. To add insult to injury, these contractors are charging taxpayers up to nine times more to do the
same jobs as soldiers, a disparity that damages troop morale.” Id. (citation omitted). Also, acknowledging the
rampant cavalier cowboy or renegade attitude that pervaded the PCMF industry, Obama stated, “Most
contractors act as if the law doesn’t apply to them. Under my plan, if contractors break the law, they will be
prosecuted.” Id. However, none of the proposed changes have been initiated since President Obama has taken
office. Furthermore, defense spending on PCMFs has only continued to escalate under this administration,
illustrating the need to rely on supranational authority to inform the limits of PCMF use. See Nick Baumann,
Barney Frank to Obama: Cut Military Spending, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 24, 2009, 11:57 AM), http://
motherjones.com/politics/2009/02/barney-frank-obama-cut-military-spending.
566 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732–33 (2004).
567 Jones, supra note 454, at 251–52.
568 Id. (citation omitted).
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prosecute, the state should comply with the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over
PCMFs in the event of misconduct.
F. Incentives for States to Participate
Putting aside the rogue refusal of states to participate in the PIB or
implement its suggestions, states stand to benefit considerably from the
enactment of such an international body. First, the codification of statuses,
rights, and liabilities stemming from the enactment will provide a marketplace
with both notice and certainty. Second, states will be assured that they are
contracting with a legitimate corporation for legitimate ends. As such, states
may contract freely with registered PCMFs without risking liability under
doctrines of state responsibility.569 This relieves states of the significant onus
of continued oversight and regulation over companies. The value of this effect
cannot be overstated—if states are outsourcing primarily for market
efficiencies, but have to perform an ongoing regulatory function, the value of
this efficiency decreases substantially. Absent the regulatory mechanism of the
PIB, a state arguably has an affirmative responsibility to ensure that the PCMF
with which it is contracting is performing its contract in accordance with
international law. States require a high ethical code of conduct from their
militaries—if states employ PCMFs as military gap-fillers, then states should
expect a corresponding level of ethical and legal compliance. With the PIB
performing the regulatory and oversight procedures, the state can contract with
clean hands, without having to maintain oversight—and remaining free of
liability if the PCMF does in fact violate international law. Third, because the
PIB is responsible for reviewing contracts prior to the contract going into
force, states will have less of an opportunity to engage in corrupt no-bid
contracts with political bedfellows. The transparency the PIB demands will
necessitate contracts that are economically fair with actors who are qualified to
perform the services sought.570 Fourth, states employing PCMFs can ensure
that the companies are not actively recruiting from the state’s own military.
Fifth, employing states can guarantee that PCMFs will receive the benefits and
protections of “combatant” status, regardless of their nationality and allegiance
to the military. Additionally, states can ensure that their nationals who serve
569

See Saad Gul, The Secretary Will Deny All Knowledge of Your Actions: The Use of Private Military
Contractors and the Implications for State and Political Accountability, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV 287, 308–
11 (2006).
570 In 2008, the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness testified before
Congress that the Bush Administration was “not prepared to manage the contractors’ critical involvement in
the American war effort in Afghanistan.” ISENBERG, supra note 22, at 143.
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PCMFs are adequately protected by the firm, with all security precautions that
the performance of the contract would require. Sixth, victims of inappropriate
PCMF conduct would have an avenue to redress their grievances and thus host
nations would not be placed in untenable positions resulting in civil distress.
Host nations, in turn, would be less reluctant to allow PCMFs to perform
contracts in their territory. Seventh, in general, the PIB will be providing
oversight and training and can thus ensure that PCMF conduct is not
effectively undermining the overall mission of the state in conflict zones.
Therefore, the PIB is in the best position to provide a comprehensive solution
to the multifaceted problems created by PCMFs by providing transparency,
accountability, and protection.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that no coherent recourse currently exists, either domestically or
internationally, that can hold PCMFs accountable for misconduct. In this
environment, PCMFs operate in conditions that resemble war—although the
conditions may not constitute an armed conflict as defined by the Geneva
Conventions—performing functions that oftentimes blur the lines between
civilian contractors and the military, without being restricted to the standard of
conduct upheld by all military personnel.571 PCMFs have received tremendous
criticism because they are perceived as conducting quasi-military operations

571 In the Government’s Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in the Blackwater indictment
for the Nisour Square shootings, the Government stated:

[T]he defendants have themselves made public statements that appear calculated to blur the lines
between the operations of Blackwater and the United States military, suggesting that the personal
security services they performed in Iraq were related to the activities of the United States
military. The defendants, for example, have recently established an internet web site for the
purpose of soliciting financial contributions for their legal defense team on this case. The heading
of each page on the web site is emblazoned with the caption “Raven 23” and a photograph of the
official seals of each military branch of the Department of Defense, as well as a photograph of
the United States Marine Corps War Memorial to the Battle of Iwo Jima. The “bios” section of
the web site contains photographs of each defendant, wearing his military uniform.
Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 9–10, United States v.
Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (2009) (No. CR-08-360) (RMU).
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with relative immunity and impunity.572 Even members of the Armed Forces
have expressed significant disdain with the PCMF climate. Brigadier General
Karl Horst stated, “These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff.
There is no authority over them, so you can’t come down on them when they
escalate force. They shoot people and someone else has to deal with the
aftermath. It happens all over the place.”573 It is painstakingly obvious that
international and domestic law desperately needs to catch up with the PCMF
legal conundrum.
Therefore, it is essential that international and domestic law address the gap
that allows PCMFs to escape liability. The only way to comprehensively
achieve this is to accord PCMFs a recognizable legal status. This can be done
effectively by codifying definitions and statuses of PCMFs and according
liabilities and protections on that basis. By using a multilateral treaty to create
an international body that provides oversight and requiring states to implement
enforcement mechanisms, the international community can ensure that no
person or company is beyond the reach of the law. This type of accountability
is absolutely imperative, given that militaries are becoming more reliant on
PCMFs in both war and peace time, where the sheer number of PCMFs may
overshadow a military presence. PCMFs, as Senator Graham predicted, appear
to be the way that nations will war in the future.574 “The old proverb used to be
that ‘War is far too important to be left to the generals.’ For international law
in the 21st century, a new adage may be necessary: War is also far too

572 Blackwater contractors have been subject to tremendous scrutiny for misconduct resulting in the death
of Iraqi civilians. Indeed, according to a report prepared by Congressman Waxman’s staff, between 2005 and
2007, Blackwater operatives opened fire on at least 195 occasions, and in 80% of these instances, Blackwater
fired first. SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 21. “These statistics were based on Blackwater’s own reporting. But some
alleged the company was underreporting its statistics.” Id. Victims or victims’ families have no recourse, as
Blackwater simply extracts the contractors from Iraq and, at most, terminates employment with the contractor
and fines them. Id. at 183; T. Christian Miller, Officials Balked on ’05 Blackwater Inquiry, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
26, 2007), http://www.latimes.com/technology/la-na-emails26oct26,0,2102897.story. At a congressional
hearing, Congresswoman Maloney discussed one incident where an intoxicated Blackwater employee shot and
killed a bodyguard to the Iraqi Vice President, stating, “If he was a member of our military, he would be under
a court-martial. But it appears to me that Blackwater has special rules.” SCAHILL, supra note 2, at 22. Prince
replied, “As a private organization, we can’t do any more. We can’t flog him, we can’t incarcerate him.” Id.
Maloney then stated, “Well, in America, if you committed a crime, you don’t pack them up and ship them out
of the country in two days.” Id.
573 Id. at 23.
574 Govern & Bales, supra note 81.
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important to be left to the C.E.O.s.”575 Therefore, it is essential that
international law regulate this type of warfare.

575

Singer, supra note 500, at 549 (citation omitted). In 2005, during a speech by then-President Bush at
John Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, a student posed the
question to President Bush, “My question is in regards to private military contractors. The Uniform Code of
Military Justice does not apply to these contractors in Iraq. I asked your secretary of defense a couple of
months ago what laws govern their actions. Mr. Rumsfeld.” George W. Bush, U.S. President, President Bush
Discusses War on Terror at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (Apr. 10,
2006) (transcript available at http://www-cgi.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0604/10/lt.02.html). President Bush
interrupted, “I was going to ask him. Go ahead. Help!” Id. The student responded,
I was hoping your answer might be a little bit more specific. Mr. Rumsfeld answered that
Iraq has its own domestic laws which he assumed applied to those private military contractors.
However, Iraq is clearly not currently capable of enforcing its laws much less . . . over our
military contractors. I would submit to you that in this case . . . privatization is not a solution.
Mr. President, how do you propose to bring private military contractors under a system of
law?
Id. President Bush replied,
Yes, I appreciate that very much.
I wasn’t kidding. I was going to pick up the phone and say, “Mr. Secretary, I’ve got an
interesting question.”
This is what delegation—I don't mean to be dodging the question, although it's kind of
convenient in this case, but—I really will. I'm going to call the secretary and say you've brought
up a very valid question, and what are we doing about it? That's how I work.
I'm—thanks.
Id. The question was aired on CNN. Id.

